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| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: An Economic THeory of Democracy Anthony Downs, 1957 |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Information, Participation, and Choice Bernard Grofman, 1993 A review of the consequences for political science of Anthony Downs's seminal work. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Using Surveys to Value Public Goods Robert Cameron Mitchell, Richard T. Carson, 1989 Provides decision makers, policy analysts, and social scientists, with a detailed discussion of a new techniques for the valuation of goods not traded in prevate markets. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Political Theory and Public Choice Anthony Downs, 1998 This volume contains a selection of Anthony Downs' essays, written since the 1950s, on politics and political theory. The articles address such issues as democracy, public choice theory, rational political decision-making and political policy. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Formal Models of Domestic Politics Scott Gehlbach, 2021-09-30 An accessible treatment of important formal models of domestic politics, fully updated and now including a chapter on nondemocracy. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy Brian Barry, 1988-09-15 Rationalist theories of political behavior have recently risen in status to that of a new—or, more accurately, rediscovered—paradigm in the systematic study of politics. Brian Barry's short, provocative book played no small part in the debate that precipitated this shift. . . . Without reservation, Barry's treatise is the most lucid and most influential critique of two important, competing perspectives in political analysis: the 'sociological' school of Talcott Parsons, Gabriel Almond, and other so-called functionalists; and the 'economic' school of Anthony Downs and Mancur Olson, among others.—Dennis J. Encarnation, American Journal of Sociology |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Free to Move Ilya Somin, 2020-04-23 Ballot box voting is often considered the essence of political freedom. But it has two major shortcomings: individual voters have little chance of making a difference, and they face strong incentives to remain ignorant about the issues at stake. Voting with your feet, however, avoids both these pitfalls and offers a wider range of choices. In Free to Move, Ilya Somin explains how broadening opportunities for foot voting can greatly enhance political liberty for millions of people around the world. People can vote with their feet through international migration, choosing where to live within a federal system, and by making decisions in the private sector. Somin addresses a variety of common objections to expanded migration rights, including claims that the self-determination of natives requires giving them the power to exclude migrants, and arguments that migration is likely to have harmful side effects, such as undermining political institutions, overburdening the welfare state, increasing crime and terrorism, and spreading undesirable cultural values. While these objections are usually directed at international migration, Somin shows how a consistent commitment to such theories would also justify severe restrictions on domestic freedom of movement. By making a systematic case for a more open world, Free to Move challenges conventional wisdom on both the left and the right. This revised and expanded edition addresses key new issues, including fears that migration could spread dangerous diseases, such as Covid-19, claims that immigrants might generate a political backlash that threatens democracy, and the impact of remote work. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory Donald Green, Ian Shapiro, 1994-09-28 This is the first comprehensive critical evaluation of the use of rational choice theory in political science. Writing in an accessible and nontechnical style, Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro assess rational choice theory where it is reputed to be most successful: the study of collective action, the behavior of political parties and politicians, and such phenomena as voting cycles and Prisoner's Dilemmas. In their hard-hitting critique, Green and Shapiro demonstrate that the much heralded achievements of rational choice theory are in fact deeply suspect and that fundamental rethinking is needed if rational choice theorists are to contribute to the understanding of politics. In their final chapters, they anticipate and respond to a variety of possible rational choice responses to their arguments, thereby initiating a dialogue that is bound to continue for some time. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Performance Politics and the British Voter Harold D. Clarke, 2009-07-23 Shows that judgment of party competence is at the heart of electoral choice in contemporary Britain. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy Charles Rowley, Friedrich Schneider, 2008-08-09 Public choice is the study of behavior at the intersection of economics and political science. Since the pioneering work of Duncan Black in the 1940s, public choice has developed a rich literature, drawing from such related perspectives as history, philosophy, law, and sociology, to analyze political decision making (by citizen-voters, elected officials, bureaucratic administrators, lobbyists, and other rational actors) in social and economic context, with an emphasis on identifying differences between individual goals and collective outcomes. Constitutional political economy provides important insights into the relationship between effective constitutions and the behavior of ordinary political markets. In Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider have assembled an international array of leading authors to present a comprehensive and accessible overview of the field and its applications. Covering a wide array of topics, including regulation and antitrust, taxation, trade liberalization, political corruption, interest group behavior, dictatorship, and environmental issues, and featuring biographies of the founding fathers of the field, this volume will be essential reading for scholars and students, policymakers, economists, sociologists, and non-specialist readers interested in the dynamics of political economy. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Against Democracy Jason Brennan, 2017-09-26 A bracingly provocative challenge to one of our most cherished ideas and institutions Most people believe democracy is a uniquely just form of government. They believe people have the right to an equal share of political power. And they believe that political participation is good for us—it empowers us, helps us get what we want, and tends to make us smarter, more virtuous, and more caring for one another. These are some of our most cherished ideas about democracy. But Jason Brennan says they are all wrong. In this trenchant book, Brennan argues that democracy should be judged by its results—and the results are not good enough. Just as defendants have a right to a fair trial, citizens have a right to competent government. But democracy is the rule of the ignorant and the irrational, and it all too often falls short. Furthermore, no one has a fundamental right to any share of political power, and exercising political power does most of us little good. On the contrary, a wide range of social science research shows that political participation and democratic deliberation actually tend to make people worse—more irrational, biased, and mean. Given this grim picture, Brennan argues that a new system of government—epistocracy, the rule of the knowledgeable—may be better than democracy, and that it's time to experiment and find out. A challenging critique of democracy and the first sustained defense of the rule of the knowledgeable, Against Democracy is essential reading for scholars and students of politics across the disciplines. Featuring a new preface that situates the book within the current political climate and discusses other alternatives beyond epistocracy, Against Democracy is a challenging critique of democracy and the first sustained defense of the rule of the knowledgeable. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Redrawing the Boundaries of the Social Sciences Philippe Fontaine, Jefferson D. Pooley, 2020-12-10 Leading historians trace the changing fortunes of the social science of social problems since World War II. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Political Competition John E ROEMER, John E Roemer, 2009-06-30 John Roemer presents a unified and rigorous theory of political competition between parties and he models the theory under many specifications, including whether parties are policy oriented or oriented toward winning, whether they are certain or uncertain about voter preferences, and whether the policy space is uni- or multidimensional. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Collective Decision-Making: Norman Schofield, 2013-03-09 In the last decade the techniques of social choice theory, game theory and positive political theory have been combined in interesting ways so as to pro vide a common framework for analyzing the behavior of a developed political economy. Social choice theory itself grew out of the innovative attempts by Ken neth Arrow (1951) and Duncan Black (1948, 1958) to extend the range of economic theory in order to deal with collective decision-making over public goods. Later work, by William Baumol (1952), and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), focussed on providing an economic interpretation of democratic institutions. In the same period Anthony Downs (1957) sought to model representative democracy and elections while William Riker (1962) made use of work in cooperative game theory (by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, 1944) to study coalition behavior. In my view, these rational choice analyses of collective decision-making have their antecedents in the arguments of Adam Smith (1759, 1776), James Madison (1787) and the Marquis de Condorcet (1785) about the design of political institutions. In the introductory chapter to this volume I briefly describe how some of the current normative and positive aspects of social choice date back to these earlier writers. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: The Calculus of Consent James M. Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, 1965 A scientific study of the political and economic factors influencing democratic decision making |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: The Reasoning Voter Samuel L. Popkin, 2020-05-15 The Reasoning Voter is an insider's look at campaigns, candidates, media, and voters that convincingly argues that voters make informed logical choices. Samuel L. Popkin analyzes three primary campaigns—Carter in 1976; Bush and Reagan in 1980; and Hart, Mondale, and Jackson in 1984—to arrive at a new model of the way voters sort through commercials and sound bites to choose a candidate. Drawing on insights from economics and cognitive psychology, he convincingly demonstrates that, as trivial as campaigns often appear, they provide voters with a surprising amount of information on a candidate's views and skills. For all their shortcomings, campaigns do matter. Professor Popkin has brought V.O. Key's contention that voters are rational into the media age. This book is a useful rebuttal to the cynical view that politics is a wholly contrived business, in which unscrupulous operatives manipulate the emotions of distrustful but gullible citizens. The reality, he shows, is both more complex and more hopeful than that.—David S. Broder, The Washington Post |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: The Rise of Candidate-Centered Politics Martin P. Wattenberg, 2013-10-01 Every presidential election since 1964 has been won by the candidate backed by the most united party; yet as party unity has become more important to voting decisions, it has also become increasingly difficult to achieve. In his latest book, Martin Wattenberg offers an in-depth interpretation of the presidential elections of the 1980s, illuminating current theories of political behavior and how they operate in today's candidate-centered politics. Wattenberg investigates the impact that political parties' declining relevance has had on presidential politics. As the parties' ability to polarize opinion weakened and voters were set politically adrift, the candidates themselves had to fill the power vacuum. Interestingly, as the candidates have become more prominent, their popularity has spiraled downward. Wattenberg's national survey data debunks the notion of Reagan as the teflon president;' demonstrating that many negative judgments stuck to Reagan's public image throughout the 1980s, particularly the criticisms of his conservative policies. The author's intricate analysis shows that many people were torn between candidates whose policies they preferred and those who they thought would produce the best results, and these contradictory attitudes were primarily resolved in favor of Reagan and Bush. This book is not only the successor volume to the author's widely used book on American parties, it is also a controversial and thought-provoking commentary on American parties, politics, and representative government. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: The Two Majorities Byron E. Shafer, William J.M. Claggett, 1995-07-25 Why do Democratic political candidates avoid the one issue on which the general public is most in agreement with them? Why do Republicans consistently raise the one issue their advisors urge them to avoid? Why do voters so often exhibit patterns of policy preference vastly different from what analysts and strategists predict? And why do these same voters consistently cast ballots that ensure the continuation of divided government? In The Two Majorities Byron Shafer and William Claggett offer groundbreaking political analysis that resolves many of the seeming contradictions in the contemporary American political scene. Drawing on an unusually large sample of all Americans, taken by the Gallup organization, Shafer and Claggett argue that the recent turbulence in American politics is in some ways superficial. Below the surface, they contend, the political preferences of the American people remain remarkably stable. Shafer and Claggett find that American public opinion is organized around two clusters of issues—both of which are favored by a majority if voters: social welfare, social insurance, and civil rights, which constitute an economic/welfare factor (associated with Democrats), and cultural values, civil liberties, and foreign relations, a cultural/national factor (associated with Republicans). Provocatively, the authors argue that each party's best strategy for success is not to try to take popular positions on the whole range of issues, but to focus attention on the party's most successful cluster of issues. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Political Capitalism Randall G. Holcombe, 2018-07-19 Problems associated with cronyism, corporatism, and policies that favor the elite over the masses have received increasing attention in recent years. Political Capitalism explains that what people often view as the result of corruption and unethical behavior are symptoms of a distinct system of political economy. The symptoms of political capitalism are often viewed as the result of government intervention in a market economy, or as attributes of a capitalist economy itself. Randall G. Holcombe combines well-established theories in economics and the social sciences to show that political capitalism is not a mixed economy, or government intervention in a market economy, or some intermediate step between capitalism and socialism. After developing the economic theory of political capitalism, Holcombe goes on to explain how changes in political ideology have facilitated the growth of political capitalism, and what can be done to redirect public policy back toward the public interest. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Democracy and Political Ignorance Ilya Somin, 2013-10-02 One of the biggest problems with modern democracy is that most of the public is usually ignorant of politics and government. Often, many people understand that their votes are unlikely to change the outcome of an election and don't see the point in learning much about politics. This may be rational, but it creates a nation of people with little political knowledge and little ability to objectively evaluate what they do know. In Democracy and Political Ignorance, Ilya Somin mines the depths of ignorance in America and reveals the extent to which it is a major problem for democracy. Somin weighs various options for solving this problem, arguing that political ignorance is best mitigated and its effects lessened by decentralizing and limiting government. Somin provocatively argues that people make better decisions when they choose what to purchase in the market or which state or local government to live under, than when they vote at the ballot box, because they have stronger incentives to acquire relevant information and to use it wisely. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: What Is Political Economy? Martin Staniland, 1985 This book is an exploration of theories of 'political economy.' Such theories are the latest products of a long-standing intellectual enterprise concerned with understanding the relationship of politics and economics. Those involved in the enterprise have often wanted not just to describe how economics and politics are related but also to suggest how they should be related-to suggest how one should shape the other. In framing their theories, they have also involved themselves in academic arguments about the value and limitations of disciplines, as well as in essentially political arguments about the relationship of theory to action. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Stuck in Traffic Anthony Downs, 2000-07-26 A Brookings Institution Press and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy publication Peak-hour traffic congestion has become a major problem in most U.S. cities. In fact, a majority of residents in metropolitan and suburban areas consider congestion their most serious local problem. As citizens have become increasingly frustrated by repeated traffic delays that cost them money and waste time, congestion has become an important factor affecting local government policies in many parts of the nation. In this new book, Anthony Downs looks at the causes of worsening traffic congestion, especially in suburban areas, and considers the possible remedies. He analyzes the specific advantages and disadvantages of every major strategy that has been proposed to reduce congestion. In nontechnical language, he focuses on two central issues: the relationships between land-use and traffic flow in rapidly growing areas, and whether local policies can effectively reduce congestion or if more regional approaches are necessary. In rapidly growing parts of the country, congestion is worse than it was five or ten years ago. But Downs notes that the problem has apparently not yet become bad enough to stimulate effective responses. Neither government officials nor citizens seem willing to consider changing the behavior and public policies that cause congestion. To alleviate the problem, both groups must be prepared to make these fundamental changes. Selected by Choice as an Outstanding Book of 1992 |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Computer Simulations of Voting Behavior William R. Shaffer, 1972 |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Liberalism Jan Narveson, Susan Dimock, Susan Whitney Dimock, 2000-12-31 No theory is more passionately and widely defined, or decried, than is liberalism in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. But what is this theory, on which so much ink is spilled? This collection of original essays by leading specialists in political philosophy, legal theory, and economics offers answers to that question, by exploring the theoretical commitments of liberals and some of the practical implications of their view. Among the topics explored is the distinction between liberalism and conservatism, and the degree to which liberals must be committed to neutrality, individualism, equality, freedom, and a contractarian theory of justification. The practical implications of liberalism are further examined by considerations of the proper role of the liberal state in undertaking egalitarian redistribution, the provision of public goods, and retributive punishment. The papers assembled by Narveson and Dimock will be of benefit to anyone working in the areas of political philosophy, political theory, or political economics. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Elections as Instruments of Democracy G. Bingham Powell, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., 2000-01-01 This text explores elections as instruments of democracy. Focusing on elections in 20 democracies over the last 25 years, it examines the differences between two visions of democracy - the majoritarian vision and the proportional influence vision. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: The Economic Vote Raymond M. Duch, Randolph T. Stevenson, 2008-03-17 This book proposes a selection model for explaining cross-national variation in economic voting: Rational voters condition the economic vote on whether incumbents are responsible for economic outcomes, because this is the optimal way to identify and elect competent economic managers under conditions of uncertainty. This model explores how political and economic institutions alter the quality of the signal that the previous economy provides about the competence of candidates. The rational economic voter is also attentive to strategic cues regarding the responsibility of parties for economic outcomes and their electoral competitiveness. Theoretical propositions are derived, linking variation in economic and political institutions to variability in economic voting. The authors demonstrate that there is economic voting, and that it varies significantly across political contexts. The data consist of 165 election studies conducted in 19 different countries over a 20-year time period. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Asymmetric Politics Matthew Grossmann, David A. Hopkins, 2016 The Republican Party is the vehicle of an ideological movement whereas the Democratic Party is a coalition of social groups with concrete policy concerns. Democrats prefer a more moderate party leadership that makes compromises, whereas Republicans favor a more conservative party leadership that sticks to principles. Each party finds popular support for its approach because the American public simultaneously favors liberal positions on specific policy issues and conservative views on the broader role of government. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice Melvin J. Hinich, Michael C. Munger, 1996-09-16 A pioneering effort to integrate ideology with formal political theory |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Political Parties and Democracy T. Inoguchi, J. Blondel, 2012-12-23 Well-reputed political scientists residing and teaching in ten countries, five in Asia and five in Europe, comparatively examine the place of political parties in democracy, and provide an empirically rigorous, up-to-date, comprehensive synthesis of the organization of political parties and their links with citizens in a democracy. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Economic Fictions Paul K. Crosser, 1957 |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: The Revolution in Real Estate Finance Anthony Downs, 1985 Analyzes the causes of the revolution in real estate finance and traces its many effects throughout real estate markets. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Principles of Public Finance Hugh Dalton Baron Dalton, 1923 Substance of lectures on the theory of public finance delivered at the London School of Economics. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Behavior Theory and Conditioning Kenneth Wartenbee 1907-1967 Spence, 2021-09-09 This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Setting the People Free John Dunn, 2005 Why does democracy, both as a word and an idea, linger so large in the political imagination today? John Dunn charts its slow but insistent metamorphosis from its roots in Ancient Greece to its overwhelming triumph in the years since 1945. Setting the People Free is an account of this extraordinary idea and its evolution. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Economic Nationalism in Old and New States Harry G. Johnson, 2021-07-29 Originally published in 1968, this book brings together contributions from social scientists in anthropology, economic history, economics and political science in an exploration of the nature and effects of economic nationalism. The opening essays presents a formal theory of nationalism that relates the phenomenon to rational government processes. Following chapters explore whether nationalism and economic development went together and whether nationalistic economic polices actually promoted development. How far British economic policy was influence by nationalism, or its corollary for a successful country-imperialism is also assessed. Examples from China, Mali, Mexico and Canada are included. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: A Unified Theory of Party Competition James F. Adams, Samuel Merrill III, Bernard Grofman, 2005-03-21 This book integrates spatial and behavioral perspectives - in a word, those of the Rochester and Michigan schools - into a unified theory of voter choice and party strategy. The theory encompasses both policy and non-policy factors, effects of turnout, voter discounting of party promises, expectations of coalition governments, and party motivations based on policy as well as office. Optimal (Nash equilibrium) strategies are determined for alternative models for presidential elections in the US and France, and for parliamentary elections in Britain and Norway. These polities cover a wide range of electoral rules, number of major parties, and governmental structures. The analyses suggest that the more competitive parties generally take policy positions that come close to maximizing their electoral support, and that these vote-maximizing positions correlate strongly with the mean policy positions of their supporters. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Power Without Knowledge Jeffrey Friedman, 2019 Do leading social-scientific experts, or technocrats, know what they are doing? In Power without Knowledge, Jeffrey Friedman maintains that they do not. Friedman shows that people are too heterogeneous to act as predictably as technocracy requires of them. Technocratic reason, then, entails a drastically oversimplified understanding of human decision making in modern society. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: The Costs of Coalition Carol Mershon, 2002 This book aims to understand and explain who governs, and for how long, under the institution of parliamentary democracy. In the process, it investigates the nature of political scientists' knowledge of coalitional behavior and how to advance it. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Redeeming Economics John D. Mueller, 2014-04-08 “Groundbreaking.” —Washington Examiner Economics is primed for—and in desperate need of—a revolution, respected economic forecaster John D. Mueller shows in this eye-opening book. To make the leap forward will require looking backward, for as Redeeming Economics reveals, the most important element of economic theory has been ignored for more than two centuries. Since the great Adam Smith tore down this pillar of economic thought, economic theory has been unable to account for a fundamental aspect of human experience: the relationships that define us, the loves (and hates) that motivate and distinguish us as persons. In trying to reduce human behavior to exchanges, modern economists have forgotten how these essential motivations are expressed: as gifts (or their opposite, crimes). Mueller makes economics whole again, masterfully reapplying the economic thought of Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas. |
| anthony downs economic theory of democracy: Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State William J. Baumol, 1965 |
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Anthony's Restaurants | The Premier Seafood Dining Exper…
We offer an array of private dining opportunities across nearly all of our locations, making Anthony’s perfect …
About Us | Seafood Dining - Anthony's Restaurants
Led by Tim Ferleman, an avid fisherman and former Anthony’s chef, the seafood arm of Anthony’s is committed to sourcing the best seafood …
Anthony’s Pier 66
Anthony’s Pier 66 is located on the downtown Seattle waterfront in the same building as Anthony’s Bell Street Diner and Anthony’s Fish Bar and …
Restaurants | Anthony's Restaurants
From dinner houses to take-out, Anthony’s provides premier seafood dining in locations throughout the Pacific Northwest. Make your …
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Anthony’s HomePort Everett is located just off the I-5 corridor and overlooks the largest saltwater marina in the Pacific Northwest. Located on Port …
