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| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: An Economic Theory of Democracy Anthony Downs, 1957 This book seeks to elucidate its subject-the governing of democratic state-by making intelligible the party politics of democracies. Downs treats this differently than do other students of politics. His explanations are systematically related to, and deducible from, precisely stated assumptions about the motivations that attend the decisions of voters and parties and the environment in which they act. He is consciously concerned with the economy in explanation, that is, with attempting to account for phenomena in terms of a very limited number of facts and postulates. He is concerned also with the central features of party politics in any democratic state, not with that in the United States or any other single country. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: An Economic Theory of Democracy Anthony Downs, 1985 |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: An Economic Theory of Democracy Anthony Downs, 1965 |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: An Economic THeory of Democracy Anthony Downs, 1957 |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Information, Participation, and Choice Bernard Grofman, 1993 A review of the consequences for political science of Anthony Downs's seminal work. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Using Surveys to Value Public Goods Robert Cameron Mitchell, Richard T. Carson, 1989 Provides decision makers, policy analysts, and social scientists, with a detailed discussion of a new techniques for the valuation of goods not traded in prevate markets. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Formal Models of Domestic Politics Scott Gehlbach, 2021-09-30 An accessible treatment of important formal models of domestic politics, fully updated and now including a chapter on nondemocracy. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Performance Politics and the British Voter Harold D. Clarke, 2009-07-23 Shows that judgment of party competence is at the heart of electoral choice in contemporary Britain. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Free to Move Ilya Somin, 2020-04-23 Ballot box voting is often considered the essence of political freedom. But it has two major shortcomings: individual voters have little chance of making a difference, and they face strong incentives to remain ignorant about the issues at stake. Voting with your feet, however, avoids both these pitfalls and offers a wider range of choices. In Free to Move, Ilya Somin explains how broadening opportunities for foot voting can greatly enhance political liberty for millions of people around the world. People can vote with their feet through international migration, choosing where to live within a federal system, and by making decisions in the private sector. Somin addresses a variety of common objections to expanded migration rights, including claims that the self-determination of natives requires giving them the power to exclude migrants, and arguments that migration is likely to have harmful side effects, such as undermining political institutions, overburdening the welfare state, increasing crime and terrorism, and spreading undesirable cultural values. While these objections are usually directed at international migration, Somin shows how a consistent commitment to such theories would also justify severe restrictions on domestic freedom of movement. By making a systematic case for a more open world, Free to Move challenges conventional wisdom on both the left and the right. This revised and expanded edition addresses key new issues, including fears that migration could spread dangerous diseases, such as Covid-19, claims that immigrants might generate a political backlash that threatens democracy, and the impact of remote work. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: A Preface to Democratic Theory Robert A. Dahl, 1956 Robert Dahl's Preface helped launch democratic theory fifty years ago as a new area of study in political science, and it remains the standard introduction to the field. Exploring problems that had been left unsolved by traditional thought on democracy, Dahl here examines two influential models--the Madisonian, which represents prevailing American doctrine, and its recurring challenger, populist theory--arguing that they do not accurately portray how modern democracies operate. He then constructs a model more consistent with how contemporary democracies actually function, and, in doing so, develops some original views of popular sovereignty and the American constitutional system. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: The Calculus of Consent James M. Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, 1965 A scientific study of the political and economic factors influencing democratic decision making |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: The Reasoning Voter Samuel L. Popkin, 2020-05-15 The Reasoning Voter is an insider's look at campaigns, candidates, media, and voters that convincingly argues that voters make informed logical choices. Samuel L. Popkin analyzes three primary campaigns—Carter in 1976; Bush and Reagan in 1980; and Hart, Mondale, and Jackson in 1984—to arrive at a new model of the way voters sort through commercials and sound bites to choose a candidate. Drawing on insights from economics and cognitive psychology, he convincingly demonstrates that, as trivial as campaigns often appear, they provide voters with a surprising amount of information on a candidate's views and skills. For all their shortcomings, campaigns do matter. Professor Popkin has brought V.O. Key's contention that voters are rational into the media age. This book is a useful rebuttal to the cynical view that politics is a wholly contrived business, in which unscrupulous operatives manipulate the emotions of distrustful but gullible citizens. The reality, he shows, is both more complex and more hopeful than that.—David S. Broder, The Washington Post |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: A Behavioral Theory of Elections Jonathan Bendor, 2011-02-06 Most theories of elections assume that voters and political actors are fully rational. This title provides a behavioral theory of elections based on the notion that all actors - politicians as well as voters - are only boundedly rational. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory Donald Green, Ian Shapiro, 1994-09-28 This is the first comprehensive critical evaluation of the use of rational choice theory in political science. Writing in an accessible and nontechnical style, Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro assess rational choice theory where it is reputed to be most successful: the study of collective action, the behavior of political parties and politicians, and such phenomena as voting cycles and Prisoner's Dilemmas. In their hard-hitting critique, Green and Shapiro demonstrate that the much heralded achievements of rational choice theory are in fact deeply suspect and that fundamental rethinking is needed if rational choice theorists are to contribute to the understanding of politics. In their final chapters, they anticipate and respond to a variety of possible rational choice responses to their arguments, thereby initiating a dialogue that is bound to continue for some time. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: The Rise of Candidate-Centered Politics Martin P. Wattenberg, 2013-10-01 Every presidential election since 1964 has been won by the candidate backed by the most united party; yet as party unity has become more important to voting decisions, it has also become increasingly difficult to achieve. In his latest book, Martin Wattenberg offers an in-depth interpretation of the presidential elections of the 1980s, illuminating current theories of political behavior and how they operate in today's candidate-centered politics. Wattenberg investigates the impact that political parties' declining relevance has had on presidential politics. As the parties' ability to polarize opinion weakened and voters were set politically adrift, the candidates themselves had to fill the power vacuum. Interestingly, as the candidates have become more prominent, their popularity has spiraled downward. Wattenberg's national survey data debunks the notion of Reagan as the teflon president;' demonstrating that many negative judgments stuck to Reagan's public image throughout the 1980s, particularly the criticisms of his conservative policies. The author's intricate analysis shows that many people were torn between candidates whose policies they preferred and those who they thought would produce the best results, and these contradictory attitudes were primarily resolved in favor of Reagan and Bush. This book is not only the successor volume to the author's widely used book on American parties, it is also a controversial and thought-provoking commentary on American parties, politics, and representative government. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy Charles Rowley, Friedrich Schneider, 2008-08-09 Public choice is the study of behavior at the intersection of economics and political science. Since the pioneering work of Duncan Black in the 1940s, public choice has developed a rich literature, drawing from such related perspectives as history, philosophy, law, and sociology, to analyze political decision making (by citizen-voters, elected officials, bureaucratic administrators, lobbyists, and other rational actors) in social and economic context, with an emphasis on identifying differences between individual goals and collective outcomes. Constitutional political economy provides important insights into the relationship between effective constitutions and the behavior of ordinary political markets. In Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider have assembled an international array of leading authors to present a comprehensive and accessible overview of the field and its applications. Covering a wide array of topics, including regulation and antitrust, taxation, trade liberalization, political corruption, interest group behavior, dictatorship, and environmental issues, and featuring biographies of the founding fathers of the field, this volume will be essential reading for scholars and students, policymakers, economists, sociologists, and non-specialist readers interested in the dynamics of political economy. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: The Two Majorities Byron E. Shafer, William J.M. Claggett, 1995-07-25 Why do Democratic political candidates avoid the one issue on which the general public is most in agreement with them? Why do Republicans consistently raise the one issue their advisors urge them to avoid? Why do voters so often exhibit patterns of policy preference vastly different from what analysts and strategists predict? And why do these same voters consistently cast ballots that ensure the continuation of divided government? In The Two Majorities Byron Shafer and William Claggett offer groundbreaking political analysis that resolves many of the seeming contradictions in the contemporary American political scene. Drawing on an unusually large sample of all Americans, taken by the Gallup organization, Shafer and Claggett argue that the recent turbulence in American politics is in some ways superficial. Below the surface, they contend, the political preferences of the American people remain remarkably stable. Shafer and Claggett find that American public opinion is organized around two clusters of issues—both of which are favored by a majority if voters: social welfare, social insurance, and civil rights, which constitute an economic/welfare factor (associated with Democrats), and cultural values, civil liberties, and foreign relations, a cultural/national factor (associated with Republicans). Provocatively, the authors argue that each party's best strategy for success is not to try to take popular positions on the whole range of issues, but to focus attention on the party's most successful cluster of issues. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Political Capitalism Randall G. Holcombe, 2018-07-19 Problems associated with cronyism, corporatism, and policies that favor the elite over the masses have received increasing attention in recent years. Political Capitalism explains that what people often view as the result of corruption and unethical behavior are symptoms of a distinct system of political economy. The symptoms of political capitalism are often viewed as the result of government intervention in a market economy, or as attributes of a capitalist economy itself. Randall G. Holcombe combines well-established theories in economics and the social sciences to show that political capitalism is not a mixed economy, or government intervention in a market economy, or some intermediate step between capitalism and socialism. After developing the economic theory of political capitalism, Holcombe goes on to explain how changes in political ideology have facilitated the growth of political capitalism, and what can be done to redirect public policy back toward the public interest. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Computer Simulations of Voting Behavior William R. Shaffer, 1972 |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: The Political Economy of Democracy and Tyranny Norman Schofield, 2009 One theme that has emerged from the recent literature on political economy concerns the transition to democracy: why would dominant elites give up oligarchic power? This book addresses the fundamental question of democratic stability and the collapse of tyranny by considering a formal model of democracy and tyranny. The formal model is used to study elections in developed polities such as the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, and Israel, as well as complex developing polities such as Turkey. The key idea is that activist groups may offer resources to political candidates if they in turn adjust their polities in favor of the interest group. In polities that use a first past the post electoral system, such as the US, the bargaining between interest groups and candidates creates a tendency for activist groups to coalesce; in polities such as Israel and the Netherlands, where the electoral system is very proportional, there may be little tendency for activist coalescence. A further feature of the model is that candidates, or political leaders, like Barack Obama, with high intrinsic charisma, or valence, will be attracted to the electoral center, while less charismatic leaders will move to the electoral periphery. This aspect of the model is used to compare the position taking and exercise of power of authoritarian leaders in Portugal, Argentina and the Soviet Union. The final chapter of the book suggests that the chaos that may be induced by climate change and rapid population growth can only be addressed by concerted action directed by a charismatic leader of the Atlantic democracies. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Liberalism Jan Narveson, Susan Dimock, Susan Whitney Dimock, 2000-12-31 No theory is more passionately and widely defined, or decried, than is liberalism in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. But what is this theory, on which so much ink is spilled? This collection of original essays by leading specialists in political philosophy, legal theory, and economics offers answers to that question, by exploring the theoretical commitments of liberals and some of the practical implications of their view. Among the topics explored is the distinction between liberalism and conservatism, and the degree to which liberals must be committed to neutrality, individualism, equality, freedom, and a contractarian theory of justification. The practical implications of liberalism are further examined by considerations of the proper role of the liberal state in undertaking egalitarian redistribution, the provision of public goods, and retributive punishment. The papers assembled by Narveson and Dimock will be of benefit to anyone working in the areas of political philosophy, political theory, or political economics. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Democracy and Political Ignorance Ilya Somin, 2013-10-02 One of the biggest problems with modern democracy is that most of the public is usually ignorant of politics and government. Often, many people understand that their votes are unlikely to change the outcome of an election and don't see the point in learning much about politics. This may be rational, but it creates a nation of people with little political knowledge and little ability to objectively evaluate what they do know. In Democracy and Political Ignorance, Ilya Somin mines the depths of ignorance in America and reveals the extent to which it is a major problem for democracy. Somin weighs various options for solving this problem, arguing that political ignorance is best mitigated and its effects lessened by decentralizing and limiting government. Somin provocatively argues that people make better decisions when they choose what to purchase in the market or which state or local government to live under, than when they vote at the ballot box, because they have stronger incentives to acquire relevant information and to use it wisely. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Preferences and Democracy Albert Breton, 1993-03-31 Villa Colombella Papers |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: The Economic Vote Raymond M. Duch, Randolph T. Stevenson, 2008-03-17 This book proposes a selection model for explaining cross-national variation in economic voting: Rational voters condition the economic vote on whether incumbents are responsible for economic outcomes, because this is the optimal way to identify and elect competent economic managers under conditions of uncertainty. This model explores how political and economic institutions alter the quality of the signal that the previous economy provides about the competence of candidates. The rational economic voter is also attentive to strategic cues regarding the responsibility of parties for economic outcomes and their electoral competitiveness. Theoretical propositions are derived, linking variation in economic and political institutions to variability in economic voting. The authors demonstrate that there is economic voting, and that it varies significantly across political contexts. The data consist of 165 election studies conducted in 19 different countries over a 20-year time period. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Principles of Public Finance Hugh Dalton Baron Dalton, 1923 Substance of lectures on the theory of public finance delivered at the London School of Economics. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Elections as Instruments of Democracy G. Bingham Powell, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., 2000-01-01 This text explores elections as instruments of democracy. Focusing on elections in 20 democracies over the last 25 years, it examines the differences between two visions of democracy - the majoritarian vision and the proportional influence vision. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice Melvin J. Hinich, Michael C. Munger, 1996-09-16 A pioneering effort to integrate ideology with formal political theory |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Political Equilibrium: A Delicate Balance Peter C. Ordeshook, K.A. Shepsle, 2012-12-06 Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle If the inaugural date of modern economics is set at 1776 with the publication of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, then the analytical tradition in the study of politics is not even a decade younger, commencing nine years later with the publication of the Marquis de Condorcet's Essai sur l'application de l'analyse iz la probabilite des decisions rendues iz la pluralite des voix. The parallel, however, stops there for, unlike Smith and other classical economists who laid an intel lectual foundation upon which a century of cumulative scientific research pro ceeded, analytical political science suffered fits and starts. Condorcet, himself, acknowledges the earlier work (predating the Essai by some fourteen years) of Borda and, from time to time during the nineteenth century, their contributions were rediscovered by Dodgson, Nanson, and other political philosophers and arithmeticians. But, by century's end, there was nothing in political science to compare to the grand edifice of general equilibrium theory in neoclassical eco nomics. Despite roots traversing two centuries, then, the analytical study of poli tics is a twentieth-century affair. The initial inspiration and insight of Condorcet was seized upon just after World War II by Duncan Black, who wrote several papers on the equilibrium properties of majority rule in specific contexts (Black, 1948a, b). He expanded upon these themes in his now deservedly famous monograph, The Theory of xi PREFACE xii Committees and Elections, and the lesser-known essay with R.A. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: The Economic Effects of Constitutions Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini, 2005-01-14 The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the missing link between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth.Persson and Tabellini's goal is to draw conclusions about the causal effects of constitutions on policy outcomes. But since constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken into account. This raises challenging methodological problems, which are addressed in the book. The study is therefore important not only in its findings but also in establishing a methodology for empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Setting the People Free John Dunn, 2005 Why does democracy, both as a word and an idea, linger so large in the political imagination today? John Dunn charts its slow but insistent metamorphosis from its roots in Ancient Greece to its overwhelming triumph in the years since 1945. Setting the People Free is an account of this extraordinary idea and its evolution. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: The Economics of Control Abba P. Lerner, 1946 |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Economic Fictions Paul K. Crosser, 1957 |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Economic Voting Han Dorussen, Michaell Taylor, 2002 This collection examines to what extents the economic situation is a decisive factor in dictating how people vote. The book combines theoretical work with empirical research and quantitative analysis. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: The Revolution in Real Estate Finance Anthony Downs, 1985 Analyzes the causes of the revolution in real estate finance and traces its many effects throughout real estate markets. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Stuck in Traffic Anthony Downs, 2000-07-26 A Brookings Institution Press and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy publication Peak-hour traffic congestion has become a major problem in most U.S. cities. In fact, a majority of residents in metropolitan and suburban areas consider congestion their most serious local problem. As citizens have become increasingly frustrated by repeated traffic delays that cost them money and waste time, congestion has become an important factor affecting local government policies in many parts of the nation. In this new book, Anthony Downs looks at the causes of worsening traffic congestion, especially in suburban areas, and considers the possible remedies. He analyzes the specific advantages and disadvantages of every major strategy that has been proposed to reduce congestion. In nontechnical language, he focuses on two central issues: the relationships between land-use and traffic flow in rapidly growing areas, and whether local policies can effectively reduce congestion or if more regional approaches are necessary. In rapidly growing parts of the country, congestion is worse than it was five or ten years ago. But Downs notes that the problem has apparently not yet become bad enough to stimulate effective responses. Neither government officials nor citizens seem willing to consider changing the behavior and public policies that cause congestion. To alleviate the problem, both groups must be prepared to make these fundamental changes. Selected by Choice as an Outstanding Book of 1992 |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Power Without Knowledge Jeffrey Friedman, 2019 Do leading social-scientific experts, or technocrats, know what they are doing? In Power without Knowledge, Jeffrey Friedman maintains that they do not. Friedman shows that people are too heterogeneous to act as predictably as technocracy requires of them. Technocratic reason, then, entails a drastically oversimplified understanding of human decision making in modern society. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State William J. Baumol, 1965 |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: Government and Markets Edward J. Balleisen, David A. Moss, 2010 After two generations of emphasis on governmental inefficiency and the need for deregulation, we now see growing interest in the possibility of constructive governance, alongside public calls for new, smarter regulation. Yet there is a real danger that regulatory reforms will be rooted in outdated ideas. As the financial crisis has shown, neither traditional market failure models nor public choice theory, by themselves, sufficiently inform or explain our current regulatory challenges. Regulatory studies, long neglected in an atmosphere focused on deregulatory work, is in critical need of new models and theories that can guide effective policy-making. This interdisciplinary volume points the way toward the modernization of regulatory theory. Its essays by leading scholars move past predominant approaches, integrating the latest research about the interplay between human behavior, societal needs, and regulatory institutions. The book concludes by setting out a potential research agenda for the social sciences. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: The Meaning of Partisanship Jonathan White, Lea Ypi, 2016-09-29 For a century at least, parties have been central to the study of politics. Yet their typical conceptual reduction to a network of power-seeking elites has left many to wonder why parties were ever thought crucial to democracy. This book seeks to retrieve a richer conception of partisanship, drawing on modern political thought and extending it in the light of contemporary democratic theory and practice. Looking beyond the party as organization, the book develops an original account of what it is to be a partisan. It examines the ideas, orientations, obligations, and practices constitutive of partisanship properly understood, and how these intersect with the core features of democratic life. Such an account serves to underline in distinctive fashion why democracy needs its partisans, and puts in relief some of the key trends of contemporary politics. |
| downs 1957 an economic theory of democracy: The Costs of Coalition Carol Mershon, 2002 This book aims to understand and explain who governs, and for how long, under the institution of parliamentary democracy. In the process, it investigates the nature of political scientists' knowledge of coalitional behavior and how to advance it. |
Batavia Downs - The Area's Premier Entertainment Destination
Conveniently located off New York State Thruway Exit 48, Batavia Downs Gaming & Hotel is the area’s premier entertainment destination. Enjoy gaming, shopping, dining, and live racing daily …
Down Syndrome - University of Rochester Medical Center
Down syndrome is a genetic disorder. It is also called trisomy 21. It includes certain birth defects, learning problems, and facial features. A child with Down syndrome also may have heart …
Rochester Resources for Families of Children With Down Syndrome
Oct 1, 2023 · Our mission is to provide education, support, and opportunities to people with Down syndrome and their families. We operate in the Greater Rochester area and are a network of …
Flower City Down Syndrome Network
Our mission is to provide education, support, and opportunities to people with Down syndrome and their families. We operate in the Greater Rochester area and are a network of families, …
Karen A. Downs Obituary (1957-2025) | Rochester, NY
July 19, 1957 - March 3, 2025 (67 years old) With solemn reverence, we commemorate Karen A. Downs in Rochester, New York, whose life came to an end on March 3, 2025 at the age of 67, …
New York – Down Syndrome Organizations
There are currently 21 Down syndrome organizations in New York: 106 W. 117th St., New York, NY 10026. Return to the top of the page.
Karen Tacy Downs Obituary - Rochester Democrat And Chronicle
Mar 7, 2025 · Karen Tacy Downs passed away on March 3, 2025, in Rochester, New York. Karen was born on July 19th, 1957, in Rochester and fought a short courageous battle against colon …
Pathfinder Village | Supporting Individuals with Down Syndrome
Pathfinder Village, an internationally renowned community for individuals with Down syndrome and developmental disabilities. Call (607) 965-8377.
Obituary of Jacqueline M. Downs | Falvo Funeral Home
August 2, 2024, at age 77. Survived by her husband of 44 years, Jim; daughter, Nikki (Joey) McIntosh; stepdaughters, Jenni (John) Raymond, Mandy Downs; 4 grandchildren; sisters …
About — THEDOOMFLOWER
kyle downs is the doom flower. He aspires to be a crafty, tattoo goblin with his partner and their mess of pets. And maybe move to someplace greener. Until then, Kyle currently works out of …
Batavia Downs - The Area's Premier Entertainment Destination
Conveniently located off New York State Thruway Exit 48, Batavia Downs Gaming & Hotel is the area’s premier entertainment destination. Enjoy gaming, shopping, dining, and live racing daily …
Down Syndrome - University of Rochester Medical Center
Down syndrome is a genetic disorder. It is also called trisomy 21. It includes certain birth defects, learning problems, and facial features. A child with Down syndrome also may have heart …
Rochester Resources for Families of Children With Down Syndrome
Oct 1, 2023 · Our mission is to provide education, support, and opportunities to people with Down syndrome and their families. We operate in the Greater Rochester area and are a network of …
Flower City Down Syndrome Network
Our mission is to provide education, support, and opportunities to people with Down syndrome and their families. We operate in the Greater Rochester area and are a network of families, …
Karen A. Downs Obituary (1957-2025) | Rochester, NY
July 19, 1957 - March 3, 2025 (67 years old) With solemn reverence, we commemorate Karen A. Downs in Rochester, New York, whose life came to an end on March 3, 2025 at the age of 67, …
New York – Down Syndrome Organizations
There are currently 21 Down syndrome organizations in New York: 106 W. 117th St., New York, NY 10026. Return to the top of the page.
Karen Tacy Downs Obituary - Rochester Democrat And Chronicle
Mar 7, 2025 · Karen Tacy Downs passed away on March 3, 2025, in Rochester, New York. Karen was born on July 19th, 1957, in Rochester and fought a short courageous battle against colon …
Pathfinder Village | Supporting Individuals with Down Syndrome
Pathfinder Village, an internationally renowned community for individuals with Down syndrome and developmental disabilities. Call (607) 965-8377.
Obituary of Jacqueline M. Downs | Falvo Funeral Home
August 2, 2024, at age 77. Survived by her husband of 44 years, Jim; daughter, Nikki (Joey) McIntosh; stepdaughters, Jenni (John) Raymond, Mandy Downs; 4 grandchildren; sisters …
About — THEDOOMFLOWER
kyle downs is the doom flower. He aspires to be a crafty, tattoo goblin with his partner and their mess of pets. And maybe move to someplace greener. Until then, Kyle currently works out of …
