Agency Problem In Finance

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The Agency Problem in Finance: A Comprehensive Guide



Author: Dr. Evelyn Reed, CFA, CAIA. Dr. Reed is a Professor of Finance at the University of California, Berkeley, with over 20 years of experience in corporate finance, specializing in governance and risk management. She is a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) and a Chartered Alternative Investment Analyst (CAIA).

Publisher: Wiley Finance. Wiley Finance is a leading publisher of financial textbooks and professional resources, known for its rigorous editorial process and commitment to delivering high-quality content for finance professionals.

Editor: Mr. David Chen, CPA. Mr. Chen is a seasoned financial editor with over 15 years of experience at Wiley Finance, focusing on corporate governance and investment management topics.


Summary: This guide provides a comprehensive overview of the agency problem in finance, a pervasive issue arising from the separation of ownership and control in corporations. We explore its various manifestations, the mechanisms used to mitigate it, and common pitfalls organizations encounter. The guide details best practices for aligning the interests of shareholders, managers, and other stakeholders, ultimately contributing to improved corporate governance and increased firm value.


Keywords: agency problem in finance, corporate governance, principal-agent problem, shareholder value, executive compensation, monitoring mechanisms, mitigating agency costs, financial incentives, corporate scandals, stakeholder theory


1. Understanding the Agency Problem in Finance



The agency problem in finance arises from the inherent conflict of interest between the principal (e.g., shareholders) and the agent (e.g., managers). Shareholders delegate decision-making authority to managers, expecting them to act in the shareholders' best interests – maximizing firm value and returns. However, managers, often possessing different goals and incentives, may act in ways that benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders. This discrepancy is the core of the agency problem in finance. It's not necessarily malicious; it's often a result of differing risk tolerances, time horizons, and information asymmetry.

2. Manifestations of the Agency Problem in Finance



The agency problem manifests in various ways, including:

Excessive Executive Compensation: Managers may negotiate exorbitant salaries, bonuses, and stock options, regardless of firm performance.
Empire Building: Managers may pursue acquisitions or expansion projects that don't enhance shareholder value but increase their power and prestige.
Risk-Taking Behavior: Managers might undertake excessively risky projects to achieve short-term gains, even if it jeopardizes long-term firm sustainability.
Short-Termism: Focusing on short-term profits at the expense of long-term investments that could yield greater returns.
Information Asymmetry: Managers often possess more information about the firm's performance and prospects than shareholders, leading to potential manipulation or concealment of unfavorable news.

3. Mitigating the Agency Problem in Finance: Best Practices



Several mechanisms can help mitigate the agency problem in finance:

Effective Corporate Governance: Strong boards of directors with independent members, robust audit committees, and clear corporate governance codes are crucial.
Executive Compensation Design: Compensation packages should be aligned with shareholder interests, using performance-based incentives like stock options and restricted stock. Clawback provisions can also be implemented to recover excessive compensation paid in case of poor performance or misconduct.
Monitoring and Auditing: Regular internal and external audits, along with independent financial reporting, enhance transparency and accountability.
Debt Financing: Higher levels of debt can discipline managers, as they are forced to meet debt obligations.
Active Shareholder Engagement: Shareholders can actively participate in corporate governance by monitoring management's actions, engaging in dialogue, and voting on crucial decisions.
Market for Corporate Control: The threat of hostile takeovers can deter managers from acting against shareholder interests.

4. Common Pitfalls in Addressing the Agency Problem in Finance



Despite the best efforts, organizations can fall into several pitfalls:

Weak Board Oversight: A passive or ineffective board of directors fails to provide adequate scrutiny of management's actions.
Misaligned Incentives: Poorly designed compensation plans can inadvertently incentivize managers to pursue self-serving goals.
Lack of Transparency: Opaque accounting practices and inadequate disclosure can conceal managerial misconduct.
Regulatory Capture: Regulatory bodies failing to effectively oversee corporations can contribute to the agency problem.

5. The Stakeholder Perspective and the Agency Problem in Finance



While the agency problem primarily focuses on the shareholder-manager relationship, a broader stakeholder perspective recognizes the interests of other stakeholders like employees, customers, and the community. Balancing the needs of all stakeholders can contribute to long-term firm success and reduce the potential for agency conflicts.


Conclusion



The agency problem in finance is a persistent challenge affecting corporate governance and firm value. By understanding its manifestations, implementing effective mitigation strategies, and avoiding common pitfalls, organizations can significantly reduce agency costs and promote sustainable growth. A proactive approach to corporate governance, coupled with a holistic stakeholder perspective, is crucial for navigating this complex issue successfully.


FAQs



1. What is the difference between the principal and the agent in finance? The principal is the owner (e.g., shareholder), while the agent is the manager acting on behalf of the principal.

2. How does information asymmetry contribute to the agency problem? Managers often have more information than shareholders, allowing them to take actions that benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders.

3. What are some examples of agency costs? Agency costs include monitoring costs, bonding costs (e.g., executive compensation), and residual losses due to managerial actions detrimental to shareholder value.

4. How can executive compensation be designed to mitigate the agency problem? Performance-based compensation, such as stock options and bonuses tied to firm performance, can align managerial interests with shareholder interests.

5. What is the role of the board of directors in addressing the agency problem? The board oversees management, ensuring they act in the best interests of shareholders. Independent directors are vital for objective oversight.

6. What is the market for corporate control, and how does it help? It’s the potential for a takeover by another firm, which incentivizes managers to act in shareholders' best interests to avoid being replaced.

7. How does debt financing influence the agency problem? Debt increases financial pressure on managers, reducing their ability to pursue self-serving actions.

8. What are some ethical implications of the agency problem? Unethical behavior such as insider trading, fraudulent accounting, and misappropriation of funds are direct consequences of unresolved agency problems.

9. How can stakeholders other than shareholders influence the mitigation of the agency problem? Active stakeholder engagement, particularly by employee groups and institutional investors, can exert pressure on management to act responsibly.


Related Articles:



1. "Executive Compensation and Firm Performance: A Review of the Literature": This article explores the link between executive pay and company performance, highlighting the role of compensation design in mitigating agency costs.

2. "The Role of Corporate Governance in Reducing Agency Costs": This article focuses on the importance of effective corporate governance mechanisms in minimizing agency conflicts.

3. "The Impact of Debt Financing on Managerial Behavior": This piece analyzes the influence of debt levels on managerial decision-making and its implications for mitigating agency problems.

4. "Information Asymmetry and the Agency Problem in the Financial Markets": This article examines the role of information asymmetry in creating agency conflicts and suggests ways to address it.

5. "The Effectiveness of Monitoring Mechanisms in Reducing Agency Costs": This explores various monitoring mechanisms (internal and external audits, etc.) and their effectiveness.

6. "Corporate Social Responsibility and the Mitigation of Agency Problems": This explores the intersection of CSR initiatives and the reduction of agency conflicts.

7. "The Agency Problem in Mutual Funds: A Case Study": This focuses on the specific agency problems within the mutual fund industry.

8. "Agency Costs and the Valuation of Firms": This article analyzes how agency costs impact firm valuation and investment decisions.

9. "The Evolution of Corporate Governance and its Impact on Agency Costs": This article provides a historical perspective on the evolution of corporate governance and its efficacy in reducing agency problems.


  agency problem in finance: Agency Problems and Financial Contracting Amir Barnea, Robert A. Haugen, Lemma W. Senbet, 1985
  agency problem in finance: Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives Günter Bamberg, Klaus Spremann, 2012-12-06 Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.
  agency problem in finance: The Effects of Agency Problems on the Financial Behavior, Performance, and Efficiency of German Industrial Stock Corporations J. Benedict Wolf, 1999 Using a catalog of seven agency problem identifier variables such as block ownership and market segment traded in, 237 German industrial stock corporations are analyzed for the time period 1986-1992. Five sectors are also analyzed separately. Agency-problem related differences in financial behavior, performance, and cost efficiency are tested for using t-tests for mean differences and logistic regressions. The cost efficiency is estimated via stochastic maximum likelihood frontier functions. Manager-controlled firms prefer free cash flows as predicted. Owners favor debt and avoid new stock issues. Contrary to theory, manager-controlled companies do not show a poorer performance than owner-controlled firms. They do, however, operate more inefficiently than firms controlled by owners.
  agency problem in finance: The Principal¿Agent Problem in Finance Sunit N. Shah, 2014-03
  agency problem in finance: Handbook of the Economics of Finance G. Constantinides, M. Harris, Rene M. Stulz, 2003-11-04 Arbitrage, State Prices and Portfolio Theory / Philip h. Dybvig and Stephen a. Ross / - Intertemporal Asset Pricing Theory / Darrell Duffle / - Tests of Multifactor Pricing Models, Volatility Bounds and Portfolio Performance / Wayne E. Ferson / - Consumption-Based Asset Pricing / John y Campbell / - The Equity Premium in Retrospect / Rainish Mehra and Edward c. Prescott / - Anomalies and Market Efficiency / William Schwert / - Are Financial Assets Priced Locally or Globally? / G. Andrew Karolyi and Rene M. Stuli / - Microstructure and Asset Pricing / David Easley and Maureen O'hara / - A Survey of Behavioral Finance / Nicholas Barberis and Richard Thaler / - Derivatives / Robert E. Whaley / - Fixed-Income Pricing / Qiang Dai and Kenneth J. Singleton.
  agency problem in finance: The Economic Nature of the Firm Randall S. Kroszner, Louis Putterman, 2009-09-21 This book brings together classic writings on the economic nature and organization of firms, including works by Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, and Michael Jensen and William Meckling, as well as more recent contributions by Paul Milgrom, Bengt Holmstrom, John Roberts, Oliver Hart, Luigi Zingales, and others. Part I explores the general theme of the firm's nature and place in the market economy; Part II addresses the question of which transactions are integrated under a firm's roof and what limits the growth of firms; Part III examines employer-employee relations and the motivation of labor; and Part IV studies the firm's organization from the standpoint of financing and the relationship between owners and managers. The volume also includes a consolidated bibliography of sources cited by these authors and an introductory essay by the editors that surveys the new institutional economics of the firm and issues raised in the anthology.
  agency problem in finance: The Anatomy of Corporate Law Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry B. Hansmann, Gérard Hertig, Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Edward B. Rock, 2009-07-23 This is the long-awaited second edition of this highly regarded comparative overview of corporate law. This edition has been comprehensively updated to reflect profound changes in corporate law. It now includes consideration of additional matters such as the highly topical issue of enforcement in corporate law, and explores the continued convergence of corporate law across jurisdictions. The authors start from the premise that corporate (or company) law across jurisdictions addresses the same three basic agency problems: (1) the opportunism of managers vis-à-vis shareholders; (2) the opportunism of controlling shareholders vis-à-vis minority shareholders; and (3) the opportunism of shareholders as a class vis-à-vis other corporate constituencies, such as corporate creditors and employees. Every jurisdiction must address these problems in a variety of contexts, framed by the corporation's internal dynamics and its interactions with the product, labor, capital, and takeover markets. The authors' central claim, however, is that corporate (or company) forms are fundamentally similar and that, to a surprising degree, jurisdictions pick from among the same handful of legal strategies to address the three basic agency issues. This book explains in detail how (and why) the principal European jurisdictions, Japan, and the United States sometimes select identical legal strategies to address a given corporate law problem, and sometimes make divergent choices. After an introductory discussion of agency issues and legal strategies, the book addresses the basic governance structure of the corporation, including the powers of the board of directors and the shareholders meeting. It proceeds to creditor protection measures, related-party transactions, and fundamental corporate actions such as mergers and charter amendments. Finally, it concludes with an examination of friendly acquisitions, hostile takeovers, and the regulation of the capital markets.
  agency problem in finance: The Academy of Management Annals James P. Walsh, Arthur P. Brief, 2007 The Academy of Management is proud to announce the inaugural volume of The Academy of Management Annals. This exciting new series follows one guiding principle: The advancement of knowledge is possible only by conducting a thorough examination of what is known and unknown in a given field. Such assessments can be accomplished through comprehensive, critical reviews of the literature--crafted by informed scholars who determine when a line of inquiry has gone astray, and how to steer the research back onto the proper path. The Academy of Management Annals provide just such essential reviews. Written by leading management scholars, the reviews are invaluable for ensuring the timeliness of advanced courses, for designing new investigative approaches, and for identifying faulty methodological or conceptual assumptions. The Annals strive each year to synthesize a vast array of primary research, recognizing past principal contributions while illuminating potential future avenues of inquiry. Volume 1 of the Annals explores a wide spectrum of research: corporate control; nonstandard employment; critical management; physical work environments; public administration team learning; emotions in organizations; leadership and health care; creativity at work; business and the environment; and bias in performance appraisals. Ultimately, academic scholars in management and allied fields (e.g., sociology of organizations and organizational psychology) will see The Academy of Management Annals as a valuable resource to turn to for comprehensive, up-to-date information--published in a single volume every year by the preeminent association for management research.
  agency problem in finance: Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance Hoang N. Pham, Sardar M. N. Islam, 2022-01-25 The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been studied extensively in corporate finance and corporate governance literature. Nevertheless, the mediation (path) analysis to examine the issue can be adopted as a new approach to explain why and how ownership structure is related to firm performance and vice versa. This approach calls for full recognition of the roles of agency costs and corporate risk-taking as essential mediating variables in the bi-directional and mediated relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Based on the agency theory, corporate risk management theory and accounting for the dynamic endogeneity in the ownership–performance relationship, this book develops two-mediator mediation models, including recursive and non-recursive mediation models, to investigate the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. It is demonstrated that agency costs and corporate risk-taking are the ‘missing links’ in the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. Hence, this book brings into attention the mediation and dynamic approach to this issue and enhances the knowledge of the mechanisms for improving firm’s financial performance. This book will be of interest to corporate finance, management and economics researchers and policy makers. Post-graduate research students in corporate governance and corporate finance will also find this book beneficial to the application of econometrics into multi-dimensional and complex issues of the firm, including ownership structure, agency problems, corporate risk management and financial performance.
  agency problem in finance: Venture Capital in Europe Greg N. Gregoriou, Maher Kooli, Roman Kraeussl, 2011-04-01 Until recently, only the United States had an active venture capital market. This is changing rapidly, as many other countries have experienced rapid growth in venture capital financing over the past five years. This book contains new scientific articles showcasing the latest research on venture capital in Europe. Venture capital investment remains a hot topic with portfolio managers, individual investors, academics worldwide. This book examines in detail all the major issues regarding venture capital investment: contracting, financing, regulation, valuation, etc. and identifies new trends in the venture capital arena. Features a foreword by Josh Lerner.*The only book in which academics from around the world present the latest research on venture capital in Europe*Covers all of Europe as well as including overview papers about venture capital industry, public and private venture capital, valuation, financing, contracting, structuring, regulation, etc. *Comprehensive, authoritative coverage
  agency problem in finance: The Theory of Corporate Finance Jean Tirole, 2010-08-26 Magnificent.—The Economist From the Nobel Prize–winning economist, a groundbreaking and comprehensive account of corporate finance Recent decades have seen great theoretical and empirical advances in the field of corporate finance. Whereas once the subject addressed mainly the financing of corporations—equity, debt, and valuation—today it also embraces crucial issues of governance, liquidity, risk management, relationships between banks and corporations, and the macroeconomic impact of corporations. However, this progress has left in its wake a jumbled array of concepts and models that students are often hard put to make sense of. Here, one of the world's leading economists offers a lucid, unified, and comprehensive introduction to modern corporate finance theory. Jean Tirole builds his landmark book around a single model, using an incentive or contract theory approach. Filling a major gap in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance is an indispensable resource for graduate and advanced undergraduate students as well as researchers of corporate finance, industrial organization, political economy, development, and macroeconomics. Tirole conveys the organizing principles that structure the analysis of today's key management and public policy issues, such as the reform of corporate governance and auditing; the role of private equity, financial markets, and takeovers; the efficient determination of leverage, dividends, liquidity, and risk management; and the design of managerial incentive packages. He weaves empirical studies into the book's theoretical analysis. And he places the corporation in its broader environment, both microeconomic and macroeconomic, and examines the two-way interaction between the corporate environment and institutions. Setting a new milestone in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance will be the authoritative text for years to come.
  agency problem in finance: Business Strategy and Corporate Governance in the Chinese Consumer Electronics Sector Hailan Yang, Stephen Morgan, 2011-10-18 This book analyses how China's firms in the consumer electronics (CE) sector have developed their business strategy and corporate governance during the reform process. The CE sector is one of China's most important and dynamic manufacturing sectors. As one of the earliest market-oriented sectors after 1978, its experience illustrates the adoption of the Western model of management in China. This is the first book to analyse the link between business strategy, corporate governance and performance of firms, explicitly comparing state-, collective-, and privately-owned firms. This book argues that the competitive dynamics of the market are central to the survival of firms in contemporary China. - Focuses on the state, collective and private Chinese firms in the consumer electronics sector - Provides insights into the interactions among political, economic and corporate factors in the China business environment that influence the strategies and performance of these firms - Compares the corporate governance of these Chinese firms across different ownership forms
  agency problem in finance: Rational Choice Theory and Organizational Theory Mary Zey, 1998 Rational Choice Theory and Organizational Theory is written in response to the neo-classical economic rational choice theories and organizational economic theories which have emerged in the past decade and gained center stage in current organizational analysis.
  agency problem in finance: A Handbook of Management Theories and Models for Office Environments and Services Rianne Appel-Meulenbroek, Vitalija Danivska, 2021-08-02 Although workplace design and management are gaining more and more attention from modern organizations, workplace research is still very fragmented and spread across multiple disciplines in academia. There are several books on the market related to workplaces, facility management (FM), and corporate real estate management (CREM) disciplines, but few open up a theoretical and practical discussion across multiple theories from different disciplines. Therefore, workplace researchers are not aware of all the angles from which workplace management and effects of workplace design on employees has been or could be studied. A lot of knowledge is lost between disciplines, and sadly, many insights do not reach workplace managers in practice. Therefore, this new book series is started by associate professor Rianne Appel-Meulenbroek (Eindhoven University of Technology, the Netherlands) and postdoc researcher Vitalija Danivska (Aalto University, Finland) as editors, published by Routledge. It is titled ‘Transdisciplinary Workplace Research and Management’ because it bundles important research insights from different disciplinary fields and shows its relevance for both academic workplace research and workplace management in practice. The books will address the complexity of the transdisciplinary angle necessary to solve ongoing workplace-related issues in practice, such as knowledge worker productivity, office use, and more strategic management. In addition, the editors work towards further collaboration and integration of the necessary disciplines for further development of the workplace field in research and in practice. This book series is relevant for workplace experts both in academia and industry. This second book in the series focuses on the role of workplace management in the organization and the tasks that workplace management needs to consider. The 18 theories that are presented in this book and applied to workplace research discuss management aspects from the organization’s perspective or dive deeper into issues related to people and/or building management. They all emphasize that workplace management is a complex matter that requires more strategic attention in order to add value for various stakeholders. The final chapter of the book describes a first step towards integrating the presented theories into an interdisciplinary framework for developing a grand workplace management theory.
  agency problem in finance: The Ownership of Enterprise Henry Hansmann, 2009-07-01 The investor-owned corporation is the conventional form for structuring large-scale enterprise in market economies. But it is not the only one. Even in the United States, noncapitalist firms play a vital role in many sectors. Employee-owned firms have long been prominent in the service professions--law, accounting, investment banking, medicine--and are becoming increasingly important in other industries. The buyout of United Airlines by its employees is the most conspicuous recent instance. Farmer-owned produce cooperatives dominate the market for most basic agricultural commodities. Consumer-owned utilities provide electricity to one out of eight households. Key firms such as MasterCard, Associated Press, and Ace Hardware are service and supply cooperatives owned by local businesses. Occupant-owned condominiums and cooperatives are rapidly displacing investor-owned rental housing. Mutual companies owned by their policyholders sell half of all life insurance and one-quarter of all property and liability insurance. And nonprofit firms, which have no owners at all, account for 90 percent of all nongovernmental schools and colleges, two-thirds of all hospitals, half of all day-care centers, and one-quarter of all nursing homes. Henry Hansmann explores the reasons for this diverse pattern of ownership. He explains why different industries and different national economies exhibit different distributions of ownership forms. The key to the success of a particular form, he shows, depends on the balance between the costs of contracting in the market and the costs of ownership. And he examines how this balance is affected by history and by the legal and regulatory framework within which firms are organized. With noncapitalist firms now playing an expanding role in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia as well as in the developed market economies of the West, The Ownership of Enterprise will be an important book for business people, policymakers, and scholars.
  agency problem in finance: Pay Without Performance Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, 2004 The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
  agency problem in finance: The Oxford Handbook Public Accountability M. A. P. Bovens, Robert E. Goodin, Thomas Schillemans, 2014-04 Drawing on the best scholars in the field from around the world, this handbook showcases conceptual and normative as well as the empirical approaches in public accountability studies.
  agency problem in finance: Responsive Regulation Ian Ayres, John Braithwaite, 1995-02-16 This book transcends current debate on government regulation by lucidly outlining how regulations can be a fruitful combination of persuasion and sanctions. The regulation of business by the United States government is often ineffective despite being more adversarial in tone than in other nations. The authors draw on both empirical studies of regulation from around the world and modern game theory to illustrate innovative solutions to this problem. Their ideas include an argument for the empowerment of private and public interest groups in the regulatory process and a provocative discussion of how the government can support and encourage industry self-regulation.
  agency problem in finance: Encyclopedia of Corporate Social Responsibility Samuel O. Idowu, Nicholas Capaldi, Liangrong Zu, Ananda Das Gupta, 2013-01-27 The role of Corporate Social Responsibility in the business world has developed from a fig leaf marketing front into an important aspect of corporate behavior over the past several years. Sustainable strategies are valued, desired and deployed more and more by relevant players in many industries all over the world. Both research and corporate practice therefore see CSR as a guiding principle for business success. The “Encyclopedia of Corporate Social Responsibility” has been conceived to assist researchers and practitioners to align business and societal objectives. All actors in the field will find reliable and up to date definitions and explanations of the key terms of CSR in this authoritative and comprehensive reference work. Leading experts from the global CSR community have contributed to make the “Encyclopedia of Corporate Social Responsibility” the definitive resource for this field of research and practice.
  agency problem in finance: The Economic Structure of Corporate Law Frank H. Easterbrook, Daniel R. Fischel, 1996-02-01 The authors argue that the rules and practices of corporate law mimic contractual provisions that parties would reach if they bargained about every contingency at zero cost and flawlessly enforced their agreements. But bargaining and enforcement are costly, and corporate law provides the rules and an enforcement mechanism that govern relations among those who commit their capital to such ventures. The authors work out the reasons for supposing that this is the exclusive function of corporate law and the implications of this perspective.
  agency problem in finance: Introduction to Earnings Management Malek El Diri, 2017-08-20 This book provides researchers and scholars with a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of earnings management theory and literature. While it raises new questions for future research, the book can be also helpful to other parties who rely on financial reporting in making decisions like regulators, policy makers, shareholders, investors, and gatekeepers e.g., auditors and analysts. The book summarizes the existing literature and provides insight into new areas of research such as the differences between earnings management, fraud, earnings quality, impression management, and expectation management; the trade-off between earnings management activities; the special measures of earnings management; and the classification of earnings management motives based on a comprehensive theoretical framework.
  agency problem in finance: Ask a Manager Alison Green, 2018-05-01 From the creator of the popular website Ask a Manager and New York’s work-advice columnist comes a witty, practical guide to 200 difficult professional conversations—featuring all-new advice! There’s a reason Alison Green has been called “the Dear Abby of the work world.” Ten years as a workplace-advice columnist have taught her that people avoid awkward conversations in the office because they simply don’t know what to say. Thankfully, Green does—and in this incredibly helpful book, she tackles the tough discussions you may need to have during your career. You’ll learn what to say when • coworkers push their work on you—then take credit for it • you accidentally trash-talk someone in an email then hit “reply all” • you’re being micromanaged—or not being managed at all • you catch a colleague in a lie • your boss seems unhappy with your work • your cubemate’s loud speakerphone is making you homicidal • you got drunk at the holiday party Praise for Ask a Manager “A must-read for anyone who works . . . [Alison Green’s] advice boils down to the idea that you should be professional (even when others are not) and that communicating in a straightforward manner with candor and kindness will get you far, no matter where you work.”—Booklist (starred review) “The author’s friendly, warm, no-nonsense writing is a pleasure to read, and her advice can be widely applied to relationships in all areas of readers’ lives. Ideal for anyone new to the job market or new to management, or anyone hoping to improve their work experience.”—Library Journal (starred review) “I am a huge fan of Alison Green’s Ask a Manager column. This book is even better. It teaches us how to deal with many of the most vexing big and little problems in our workplaces—and to do so with grace, confidence, and a sense of humor.”—Robert Sutton, Stanford professor and author of The No Asshole Rule and The Asshole Survival Guide “Ask a Manager is the ultimate playbook for navigating the traditional workforce in a diplomatic but firm way.”—Erin Lowry, author of Broke Millennial: Stop Scraping By and Get Your Financial Life Together
  agency problem in finance: Drive Daniel H. Pink, 2011-04-05 The New York Times bestseller that gives readers a paradigm-shattering new way to think about motivation from the author of When: The Scientific Secrets of Perfect Timing Most people believe that the best way to motivate is with rewards like money—the carrot-and-stick approach. That's a mistake, says Daniel H. Pink (author of To Sell Is Human: The Surprising Truth About Motivating Others). In this provocative and persuasive new book, he asserts that the secret to high performance and satisfaction-at work, at school, and at home—is the deeply human need to direct our own lives, to learn and create new things, and to do better by ourselves and our world. Drawing on four decades of scientific research on human motivation, Pink exposes the mismatch between what science knows and what business does—and how that affects every aspect of life. He examines the three elements of true motivation—autonomy, mastery, and purpose-and offers smart and surprising techniques for putting these into action in a unique book that will change how we think and transform how we live.
  agency problem in finance: Artificial Intelligence in Economics and Finance Theories Tankiso Moloi, Tshilidzi Marwala, 2020-05-07 As Artificial Intelligence (AI) seizes all aspects of human life, there is a fundamental shift in the way in which humans are thinking of and doing things. Ordinarily, humans have relied on economics and finance theories to make sense of, and predict concepts such as comparative advantage, long run economic growth, lack or distortion of information and failures, role of labour as a factor of production and the decision making process for the purpose of allocating resources among other theories. Of interest though is that literature has not attempted to utilize these advances in technology in order to modernize economic and finance theories that are fundamental in the decision making process for the purpose of allocating scarce resources among other things. With the simulated intelligence in machines, which allows machines to act like humans and to some extent even anticipate events better than humans, thanks to their ability to handle massive data sets, this book will use artificial intelligence to explain what these economic and finance theories mean in the context of the agent wanting to make a decision. The main feature of finance and economic theories is that they try to eliminate the effects of uncertainties by attempting to bring the future to the present. The fundamentals of this statement is deeply rooted in risk and risk management. In behavioural sciences, economics as a discipline has always provided a well-established foundation for understanding uncertainties and what this means for decision making. Finance and economics have done this through different models which attempt to predict the future. On its part, risk management attempts to hedge or mitigate these uncertainties in order for “the planner” to reach the favourable outcome. This book focuses on how AI is to redefine certain important economic and financial theories that are specifically used for the purpose of eliminating uncertainties so as to allow agents to make informed decisions. In effect, certain aspects of finance and economic theories cannot be understood in their entirety without the incorporation of AI.
  agency problem in finance: The Control of Corporate Europe Fabrizio Barca, Marco Becht, 2001-11-15 Written by an international team of authors, this book provides the first systematic account of the control of corporate Europe based on voting block data disclosed in accordance with the European Union's Large Holdings Directive (88/627/EEC). The study provides detailed information on the voting control of companies listed on the official markets in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, as a benchmark comparison, the United States. The authors record a high concentration of control of corporations in many European countries with single blockholders frequently controlling more than fifty per cent of corporate votes. In contrast, a majority of UK listed companies have no blockholder owning more than ten per cent of shares, and a majority of US listed companies have no blockholder with more than six per cent of shares. Those chapters devoted to individual countries illustrate how blockholders can use legal devices to leverage their voting power over their cash-flow rights, or how incumbents prevent outsiders from gaining voting control. It is shown that the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe is (almost) matched by its variety of corporate control arrangements.
  agency problem in finance: Performance, Risk and Competition in the Chinese Banking Industry Yong Tan, 2014-10-08 Due to the financial crisis around the world, stability of the banking sector is critical. Several rounds of banking reforms in China have aimed to improve performance and competition, and Performance, Risk and Competition in the Chinese Banking Industry provides a comprehensive analysis of performance, risk, competition and their relationships in Chinese banking industry. The book consists of seven chapters: the first chapter gives an introduction, followed by an overview of the Chinese banking sector in chapter two. Chapter three discusses corporate governance in the Chinese banking sector. The fourth and fifth chapters investigate risk, performance, competition, and their relationships. Chapter six outlines future development of the Chinese banking sector, and finally, chapter seven provides a conclusion. - Provides a comprehensive analysis of risk conditions in the Chinese banking sector - A detailed investigation on the performance of the Chinese banking sector - Examines the state of competition
  agency problem in finance: Financial Management; Principles and Practice ,
  agency problem in finance: The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management , 2018-05-04 The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management has been written by an international team of leading academics, practitioners and rising stars and contains almost 550 individually commissioned entries. It is the first resource of its kind to pull together such a comprehensive overview of the field and covers both the theoretical and more empirically/practitioner oriented side of the discipline.
  agency problem in finance: Handbook of Health Economics Mark V. Pauly, Thomas G. McGuire, Pedro Pita Barros, 2012-01-05 As a relatively new subdiscipline of economics, health economics has made many contributions to areas of the main discipline, such as insurance economics. This volume provides a survey of the burgeoning literature on the subject of health economics. {source : site de l'éditeur].
  agency problem in finance: Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives Wolfgang Ballwieser, 1987-01-01
  agency problem in finance: International Corporate Governance Kose John, Anil K. Makhija, 2011-03-31 Presents research on corporate governance from a number of countries across the world, including the United States, Spain, Malaysia, Israel and others. This title examines many important corporate governance mechanisms, such as board characteristics, ownership structure, legal protection of shareholders, and annual general meetings.
  agency problem in finance: Incentives, Control and Development Dhiman Chowdhury, 2004
  agency problem in finance: The Pig Book Citizens Against Government Waste, 2013-09-17 The federal government wastes your tax dollars worse than a drunken sailor on shore leave. The 1984 Grace Commission uncovered that the Department of Defense spent $640 for a toilet seat and $436 for a hammer. Twenty years later things weren't much better. In 2004, Congress spent a record-breaking $22.9 billion dollars of your money on 10,656 of their pork-barrel projects. The war on terror has a lot to do with the record $413 billion in deficit spending, but it's also the result of pork over the last 18 years the likes of: - $50 million for an indoor rain forest in Iowa - $102 million to study screwworms which were long ago eradicated from American soil - $273,000 to combat goth culture in Missouri - $2.2 million to renovate the North Pole (Lucky for Santa!) - $50,000 for a tattoo removal program in California - $1 million for ornamental fish research Funny in some instances and jaw-droppingly stupid and wasteful in others, The Pig Book proves one thing about Capitol Hill: pork is king!
  agency problem in finance: Other People's Money John Kay, 2015-09-22 The finance sector of Western economies is too large and attracts too many of the smartest college graduates. Financialization over the past three decades has created a structure that lacks resilience and supports absurd volumes of trading. The finance sector devotes too little attention to the search for new investment opportunities and the stewardship of existing ones, and far too much to secondary-market dealing in existing assets. Regulation has contributed more to the problems than the solutions. Why? What is finance for? John Kay, with wide practical and academic experience in the world of finance, understands the operation of the financial sector better than most. He believes in good banks and effective asset managers, but good banks and effective asset managers are not what he sees. In a dazzling and revelatory tour of the financial world as it has emerged from the wreckage of the 2008 crisis, Kay does not flinch in his criticism: we do need some of the things that Citigroup and Goldman Sachs do, but we do not need Citigroup and Goldman to do them. And many of the things done by Citigroup and Goldman do not need to be done at all. The finance sector needs to be reminded of its primary purpose: to manage other people's money for the benefit of businesses and households. It is an aberration when the some of the finest mathematical and scientific minds are tasked with devising algorithms for the sole purpose of exploiting the weakness of other algorithms for computerized trading in securities. To travel further down that road leads to ruin. A Financial Times Book of the Year, 2015 An Economist Best Book of the Year, 2015 A Bloomberg Best Book of the Year, 2015
  agency problem in finance: Finance John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, Peter Newman, 1989-11-01 This is an excerpt from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This extract concentrates on finance.
  agency problem in finance: Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System Richard M. Levich, Giovanni Majnoni, Carmen Reinhart, 2012-12-06 Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System brings together the research of economists at New York University and the University of Maryland, along with those from the private sector, government bodies, and other universities. The first section of the volume focuses on the historical origins of the credit rating business and its present day industrial organization structure. The second section presents several empirical studies crafted largely around individual firm-level or bank-level data. These studies examine (a) the relationship between ratings and the default and recovery experience of corporate borrowers, (b) the comparability of credit ratings made by domestic and foreign rating agencies, and (c) the usefulness of financial market indicators for rating banks, among other topics. In the third section, the record of sovereign credit ratings in predicting financial crises and the reaction of financial markets to changes in credit ratings is examined. The final section of the volume emphasizes policy issues now facing regulators and credit rating agencies.
  agency problem in finance: The Theory of Incentives Jean-Jacques Laffont, David Martimort, 2009-12-27 Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the simple situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
  agency problem in finance: Creating Shareholder Value Alfred Rappaport, 1999-10-13 Economist, consultant, and Wall Street Journal contributor Alfred Rappaport provides managers and investors with the practical tools and tests for a corporate strategy that creates shareholder value. The ultimate test of corporate strategy, the only reliable measure, is whether it creates economic value for shareholders. After a decade of downsizings frequently blamed on shareholder value decision making, this book presents a new and indepth assessment of the rationale for shareholder value. Further, Rappaport presents provocative new insights on shareholder value applications to: (1) business planning, (2) performance evaluation, (3) executive compensation, (4) mergers and acquisitions, (5) interpreting stock market signals, and (6) organizational implementation. Readers will be particularly interested in Rappaport's answers to three management performance evaluation questions: (1) What is the most appropriate measure of performance? (2) What is the most appropriate target level of performance? and (3) How should rewards be linked to performance? Through the lens of high-stakes case studies, like the notable acquisition of Duracell International by Gillette, Rappaport dissects the intricate decisions and risks inherent in the merger and acquisition process. The shareholder value approach presented here has been widely embraced by publicly traded as well as privately held companies worldwide. Brilliant and incisive, this is the one book that should be required reading for managers and investors who want to stay on the cutting edge of success in a highly competitive global economy.
  agency problem in finance: Corporate Capital Structures in the United States Benjamin M. Friedman, 2009-05-15 The research reported in this volume represents the second stage of a wide-ranging National Bureau of Economic Research effort to investigate The Changing Role of Debt and Equity in Financing U.S. Capital Formation. The first group of studies sponsored under this project, which have been published individually and summarized in a 1982 volume bearing the same title (Friedman 1982), addressed several key issues relevant to corporate sector behavior along with such other aspects of the evolving financial underpinnings of U.S. capital formation as household saving incentives, international capital flows, and government debt management. In the project's second series of studies, presented at the National Bureau of Economic Research conference in January 1983 and published here for the first time along with commentaries from that conference, the central focus is the financial side of capital formation undertaken by the U.S. corporate business sector. At the same time, because corporations' securities must be held, a parallel focus is on the behavior of the markets that price these claims.
  agency problem in finance: Ethnostatistics Robert P. Gephart, 1988-02-01 This volume discusses ethnostatistics - the interpretative study of the construction and use of statistics in social research - and will be of equal interest to qualitative and quantitative researchers across the social sciences. On the understanding that the development of a statistic is inherently a qualitative act, the author shows how this act can be studied and analyzed. The interpretative factors in statistical work can be demonstrated at a variety of levels; Gephart shows how each can be usefully illuminated through the use of ethnostatistics to produce more effective, reflexive social research.
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