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| examples of folk psychology: Do Apes Read Minds? Kristin Andrews, 2012-07-20 Andrews argues for a pluralistic folk psychology that employs different kinds of practices and different kinds of cognitive tools (including personality trait attribution, stereotype activation, inductive reasoning about past behavior, and generalization from self) that are involved in our folk psychological practices. |
| examples of folk psychology: The Importance of Being Understood Adam Morton, 2005-06-29 The Importance of Being Understood is an innovative and thought-provoking exploration of the links between the way we think about each other's mental states and the fundamentally cooperative nature of everyday life. Adam Morton begins with a consideration of 'folk psychology', the tendency to attribute emotions, desires, beliefs and thoughts to human minds. He takes the view that it is precisely this tendency that enables us to understand, predict and explain the actions of others, which in turn helps us to decide on our own course of action. This relection suggests, claims Morton, that certain types of cooperative activity are dependent on everyday psychological understanding conversely, that we act in such a way as to make our actions easily intelligible to others so that we can benefit from being understood. This idea of 'beneficial circularities' is at the core of Morton's investigation of the interdependencies between folk psychology and social behaviour: we understand each other because we have learned to make ourselves intelligible. Using examples of cooperative activities such as car driving and playing tennis, Adam Morton analyses the concepts of belief and simulation, the idea of explanation by motive, and the causal force of psychological explanation. In addition to argument and analysis, Morton also includes more speculative explorations of topics such as moral progress and presents a new point of view on how and why cultures differ. The Importance of Being Understood forges new links between ethics and the philosophy of mind and will be of interest to anyone in either field, as well as developmental psychologists. |
| examples of folk psychology: Folk Psychology Re-Assessed D. Hutto, Matthew M. Ratcliffe, 2007-09-06 This is a truly groundbreaking work that examines today’s notions of folk psychology. Bringing together disciplines as various as cognitive science and anthropology, the authors analyze the consensual views of the subject. The contributors all maintain that current understandings of folk psychology and of the mechanisms that underlie it need to be revised, supplemented or dismissed altogether. That’s why this book is essential reading for those in the field. |
| examples of folk psychology: Folk Psychological Narratives Daniel D. Hutto, 2012-08-24 An argument that challenges the dominant theory theory and simulation theory approaches to folk psychology by claiming that our everyday understanding of intentional actions done for reasons is acquired by exposure to and engaging in specific kinds of narratives. Established wisdom in cognitive science holds that the everyday folk psychological abilities of humans—our capacity to understand intentional actions performed for reasons—are inherited from our evolutionary forebears. In Folk Psychological Narratives, Daniel Hutto challenges this view (held in somewhat different forms by the two dominant approaches, theory theory and simulation theory) and argues for the sociocultural basis of this familiar ability. He makes a detailed case for the idea that the way we make sense of intentional actions essentially involves the construction of narratives about particular persons. Moreover he argues that children acquire this practical skill only by being exposed to and engaging in a distinctive kind of narrative practice. Hutto calls this developmental proposal the narrative practice hypothesis (NPH). Its core claim is that direct encounters with stories about persons who act for reasons (that is, folk psychological narratives) supply children with both the basic structure of folk psychology and the norm-governed possibilities for wielding it in practice. In making a strong case for the as yet underexamined idea that our understanding of reasons may be socioculturally grounded, Hutto not only advances and explicates the claims of the NPH, but he also challenges certain widely held assumptions. In this way, Folk Psychological Narratives both clears conceptual space around the dominant approaches for an alternative and offers a groundbreaking proposal. |
| examples of folk psychology: 50 Great Myths of Popular Psychology Scott O. Lilienfeld, Steven Jay Lynn, John Ruscio, Barry L. Beyerstein, 2011-09-15 50 Great Myths of Popular Psychology uses popular myths as a vehicle for helping students and laypersons to distinguish science from pseudoscience. Uses common myths as a vehicle for exploring how to distinguish factual from fictional claims in popular psychology Explores topics that readers will relate to, but often misunderstand, such as 'opposites attract', 'people use only 10% of their brains', and 'handwriting reveals your personality' Provides a 'mythbusting kit' for evaluating folk psychology claims in everyday life Teaches essential critical thinking skills through detailed discussions of each myth Includes over 200 additional psychological myths for readers to explore Contains an Appendix of useful Web Sites for examining psychological myths Features a postscript of remarkable psychological findings that sound like myths but that are true Engaging and accessible writing style that appeals to students and lay readers alike |
| examples of folk psychology: Rethinking Commonsense Psychology Matthew Ratcliffe, 2016-01-13 This book offers arguments against the view that interpersonal understanding involves a 'folk' or 'commonsense' psychology, a view which Ratcliffe suggests is a theoretically motivated abstraction. His alternative account draws on phenomenology, neuroscience and developmental psychology, exploring patterned interactions in shared social situations. |
| examples of folk psychology: Mindshaping Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki, 2013-05-10 A proposal that human social cognition would not have evolved without mechanisms and practices that shape minds in ways that make them easier to interpret. In this novel account of distinctively human social cognition, Tadeusz Zawidzki argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse, and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret. Zawidzki proposes that such mindshaping—which takes the form of capacities and practices such as sophisticated imitation, pedagogy, conformity to norms, and narrative self-constitution—is the most important component of human social cognition. Without it, he argues, none of the other components of what he terms the human sociocognitive syndrome, including sophisticated language, cooperation, and sophisticated mindreading, would be possible. Challenging the dominant view that sophisticated mindreading—especially propositional attitude attribution—is the key evolutionary innovation behind distinctively human social cognition, Zawidzki contends that the capacity to attribute such mental states depends on the evolution of mindshaping practices. Propositional attitude attribution, he argues, is likely to be unreliable unless most of us are shaped to have similar kinds of propositional attitudes in similar circumstances. Motivations to mindshape, selected to make sophisticated cooperation possible, combine with low-level mindreading abilities that we share with nonhuman species to make it easier for humans to interpret and anticipate each other's behavior. Eventually, this led, in human prehistory, to the capacity to attribute full-blown propositional attitudes accurately—a capacity that is parasitic, in phylogeny and today, on prior capacities to shape minds. Bringing together findings from developmental psychology, comparative psychology, evolutionary psychology, and philosophy of psychology, Zawidzki offers a strikingly original framework for understanding human social cognition. |
| examples of folk psychology: Pieces of Mind Carrie Figdor, 2018 Carrie Figdor presents a critical assessment of how psychological terms are used to describe the non-human biological world. She argues against the anthropocentric attitude which takes human cognition as the standard against which non-human capacities are measured, and offers an alternative basis for naturalistic explanation of the mind. |
| examples of folk psychology: Folk Illusions K. Brandon Barker, Claiborne Rice, 2019-04-22 Wiggling a pencil so that it looks like it is made of rubber, stealing your niece's nose, and listening for the sounds of the ocean in a conch shell– these are examples of folk illusions, youthful play forms that trade on perceptual oddities. In this groundbreaking study, K. Brandon Barker and Claiborne Rice argue that these easily overlooked instances of children's folklore offer an important avenue for studying perception and cognition in the contexts of social and embodied development. Folk illusions are traditionalized verbal and/or physical actions that are performed with the intention of creating a phantasm for one or more participants. Using a cross-disciplinary approach that combines the ethnographic methods of folklore with the empirical data of neuroscience, cognitive science, and psychology, Barker and Rice catalogue over eighty discrete folk illusions while exploring the complexities of embodied perception. Taken together as a genre of folklore, folk illusions show that people, starting from a young age, possess an awareness of the illusory tendencies of perceptual processes as well as an awareness that the distinctions between illusion and reality are always communally formed. |
| examples of folk psychology: Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology Tamar Gendler, 2010-12-09 Tamar Gendler draws together in this book a series of essays in which she investigates philosophical methodology, which is now emerging as a central topic of philosophical discussions. Three intertwined themes run through the volume: imagination, intuition and philosophical methodology. Each of the chapters focuses, in one way or another, on how we engage with subject matter that we take to be imaginary. This theme is explored in a wide range of cases, including scientific thought experiments, early childhood pretense, thought experiments concerning personal identity, fictional emotions, self-deception, Gettier cases, and the general relation of conceivability to possibility. Each of the chapters explores, in one way or another, the implications of this for how thought experiments and appeals to intuition can serve as mechanisms for supporting or refuting scientific or philosophical claims. And each of the chapters self-consciously exhibits a particular philosophical methodology: that of drawing both on empirical findings from contemporary psychology, and on classic texts in the philosophical tradition (particularly the work of Aristotle and Hume.) By exploring and exhibiting the fruitfulness of these interactions, Gendler promotes the value of engaging in such cross-disciplinary conversations in illuminating philosophical issues. |
| examples of folk psychology: The Continuum Companion to Philosophy of Mind James Garvey, 2011-04-28 A comprehensive reference guide to current research in Philosophy of Mind, assembled by an international team of leading scholars in the discipline. |
| examples of folk psychology: Content and Consciousness Revisited Carlos Muñoz-Suárez, Felipe De Brigard, 2015-07-10 What are the grounds for the distinction between the mental and the physical? What is it the relation between ascribing mental states to an organism and understanding its behavior? Are animals and complex systems vehicles of inner evolutionary environments? Is there a difference between personal and sub-personal level processes in the brain? Answers to these and other questions were developed in Daniel Dennett’s first book, Content and Consciousness (1969), where he sketched a unified theoretical framework for views that are now considered foundational in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Content and Consciousness Revisited is devoted to reconsider the ideas and ideals introduced in Dennett’s seminal book, by covering its fundamental concepts, hypotheses and approaches and taking into account the findings and progress which have taken place during more than four decades. This book includes original and critical contributions about the relations between science and philosophy, the personal/sub-personal level distinction, intelligence, learning, intentionality, rationality, propositional attitudes, among other issues of scientific and philosophical interest. Each chapter embraces an updated approach to several disciplines, like cognitive science, cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind and cognitive psychiatry. |
| examples of folk psychology: The Presence of Mind Daniel D. Hutto, 1999 Will our everyday account of ourselves be vindicated by a new science? Or, will our self-understanding remain untouched by such developments? This book argues that beliefs and desires have a legitimate place in theexplanation of action. Eliminativist arguments mistakenly focus on the vehicles of content not content itself. This book asks whether a naturalistic theory of content is possible. It is argued that a modest biosemantic theory of intentional, but nonconceptual, content is the naturalist's best bet. A theory of this kind complements connectionism and recent work on embodied and embedded cognition. But intentional content is not equivalent to propositional content. In order to understand propositional content we must rely on Davidsonian radical interpretation.However, radical interpretation is shown to be at odds with physicalism. But if the best naturalised theory of content we are likely to get from cognitive science is only a theory of intentional content, then a naturalistic explanation of scientific theorising is not possible. It is concluded that cognitive science alone cannot explain the nature of our minds and that eliminativism is intellectually incoherent. (Series A) |
| examples of folk psychology: Matter and Consciousness Paul M. Churchland, 1988 In Matter and Consciousness, Paul Churchland clearly presents the advantages and disadvantages of such difficult issues in philosophy of mind as behaviorism, reductive materialism, functionalism, and eliminative materialism. This new edition incorporates the striking developments that have taken place in neuroscience, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence and notes their expanding relevance to philosophical issues. Churchland organizes and clarifies the new theoretical and experimental results of the natural sciences for a wider philosophical audience, observing that this research bears directly on questions concerning the basic elements of cognitive activity and their implementation in real physical systems. (How is it, he asks, that living creatures perform some cognitive tasks so swiftly and easily, where computers do them only badly or not at all?) Most significant for philosophy, Churchland asserts, is the support these results tend to give to the reductive and the eliminative versions of materialism. A Bradford Book |
| examples of folk psychology: The Mechanical Mind Tim Crane, 2003-04-24 A fascinating exploration of the theories and arguments surrounding the notions of thought and representation. Now in its 2nd edition, Cranes's classic text has introduced thousands to some of the most important ideas in philosophy of mind. |
| examples of folk psychology: The Neuroscience of Empathy, Compassion, and Self-Compassion Larry Charles Stevens, C. Chad Woodruff, 2018-06-19 The Neuroscience of Empathy, Compassion, and Self-Compassion provides contemporary perspectives on the three related domains of empathy, compassion and self-compassion (ECS). It informs current research, stimulates further research endeavors, and encourages continued and creative philosophical and scientific inquiry into the critical societal constructs of ECS. Examining the growing number of electrocortical (EEG Power Spectral, Coherence, Evoked Potential, etc.) studies and the sizeable body of exciting neuroendocrine research (e.g., oxytocin, dopamine, etc.) that have accumulated over decades, this reference is a unique and comprehensive approach to empathy, compassion and self-compassion. - Provides perspectives on empathy, compassion and self-compassion (ECS), including discussions of cruelty, torture, killings, homicides, suicides, terrorism and other examples of empathy/compassion erosion - Addresses autonomic nervous system (vagal) reflections of ECS - Discusses recent findings and understanding of ECS from mirror neuron research - Covers neuroendocrine manifestations of ECS and self-compassion and the neuroendocrine enhancement - Examines the neuroscience research on the enhancement of ECS - Includes directed-meditations (mindfulness, mantra, Metta, etc.) and their effects on ECS and the brain |
| examples of folk psychology: The Mind Doesn't Work that Way Jerry A. Fodor, 2000 Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and that the explanation of our innate mental structure is basically Darwinian. |
| examples of folk psychology: The Scientific Credibility of Folk Psychology Garth J. O. Fletcher, 1995 The examination and evaluation of folk psychology and lay cognition has been carried out predominantly in two domains: personality and social psychology, and the philosophy of psychology. Yet, work in these two areas has largely proceeded independently. The assumption on which this volume is founded is that a proper comparison between scientific cognition and folk ways of thought rests on an adequate study of both science and folk psychology. With this in mind, the author provides an analysis of the intricate, and often hidden, links between these two spheres. In doing so, the book poses two related questions. First, what is the nature of folk psychology and how is it related to scientific psychology? Second, of what should the relationship between folk psychology and scientific psychology consist? In answering these two questions, the author draws extensively from research and arguments in social psychology and social cognition, cognitive science, and the philosophy of science. The interdisciplinary approach gives the book a unique perspective that will be of interest to scholars working in social psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy of science. Written in a concise and accessible style, this volume is suitable for undergraduate and graduate students as well as a general psychological audience. |
| examples of folk psychology: Addiction and Self-Control Neil Levy, 2013-12 This book brings cutting edge neuroscience and psychology into dialogue with philosophical reflection to illuminate the loss of control experienced by addicts, and thereby cast light on ordinary agency and the way in which it sometimes goes wrong. |
| examples of folk psychology: The Culture of Education Jerome Bruner, 1996 In a masterly commentary on the possibilities of education, Bruner reveals how education can usher children into their culture, though it often fails to do so. Bruner looks past the issue of achieving individual competence to the question of how education equips individuals to participate in the culture on which life and livelihood depend. |
| examples of folk psychology: From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science : The Case Against Belief , 1983 |
| examples of folk psychology: Elements of Folk Psychology Wilhelm Max Wundt, Edward Leroy Schaub, 1921 |
| examples of folk psychology: Representation Reconsidered William M. Ramsey, 2007-06-21 Publisher description |
| examples of folk psychology: Believing in Magic Stuart A. Vyse, 2013-11 In this fully updated edition of Believing in Magic, renowned superstition expert Stuart Vyse investigates our tendency towards these irrational beliefs. |
| examples of folk psychology: Theoretical Issues in Psychology Sacha Bem, Huib Looren de Jong, 2013-05-22 Bem and de Jong present complex ideas in an accessible manner. Theoretical Issues in Psychology gives undergraduate psychology students all the resources they need to begin reflecting on the most pressing conceptual issues in their discipline. - Stuart Wilson, Queen Margaret University The 3rd edition of Theoretical Issues in Psychology provides an authoritative overview of the conceptual issues in psychology which introduces the underlying philosophies that underpin them. It includes new insights across the philosophy of science combined with increased psychological coverage to show clearly how these two communities interrelate, ensuring an integrative understanding of the fundamental debates and how they link to your wider studies. Key features of this new edition include: Concise paragraphs, multiple examples and additional summaries throughout to help you focus on key areas of knowledge. Textboxes with definitions and key concepts to help your understanding of the main debates and ideas. New content on the philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, cognition and cognitive neuroscience. New up-to-date material on consciousness and evolutionary psychology. For lecturers and teachers, PowerPoint slides are available for each chapter. Sacha Bem & Huib Looren de Jong′s textbook remains essential for students taking courses in conceptual and historical issues in psychology, the philosophy of psychology or theoretical psychology. |
| examples of folk psychology: The Philosophy of Psychology George Botterill, Peter Carruthers, 1999-08-19 What is the relationship between common-sense, or 'folk', psychology and contemporary scientific psychology? Are they in conflict with one another? Or do they perform quite different, though perhaps complementary, roles? George Botterill and Peter Carruthers discuss these questions, defending a robust form of realism about the commitments of folk psychology and about the prospects for integrating those commitments into natural science. Their focus throughout the book is on the ways in which cognitive science presents a challenge to our common-sense self-image - arguing that our native conception of the mind will be enriched, but not overturned, by science. The Philosophy of Psychology is designed as a textbook for upper-level undergraduate and beginning graduate students in philosophy and cognitive science, but as a text that not only surveys but advances the debates on the topics discussed, it will also be of interest to researchers working in these areas. |
| examples of folk psychology: Linguistic Behaviour Jonathan Bennett, 1990-01-01 . . . advances aggressively through pertinent and lively argument. . . . There are numerous brief and incisive responses to important philosophers of language (Sellars, Quine, Dummett, Putnam, Chomsky, Ziff) on issues of major significance and no little controversy. -- Margaret Urban Coyne, International Philosophical Quarterly |
| examples of folk psychology: Gareth and Lynette Lancelot and Elaine the Passing of Arthur Houghton Mifflin Company, 2019-03-16 This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. |
| examples of folk psychology: Unclean Richard Beck, 2012-05-31 I desire mercy, not sacrifice. Echoing Hosea, Jesus defends his embrace of the unclean in the Gospel of Matthew, seeming to privilege the prophetic call to justice over the Levitical pursuit of purity. And yet, as missional faith communities arewell aware, the tensions and conflicts between holiness and mercy are not so easily resolved. In an unprecedented fusion of psychological science and theological scholarship, Richard Beck describes the pernicious (and largely unnoticed) effects of the psychology of purity upon the life and mission of the church. |
| examples of folk psychology: Laws of UX Jon Yablonski, 2020-04-21 An understanding of psychology—specifically the psychology behind how users behave and interact with digital interfaces—is perhaps the single most valuable nondesign skill a designer can have. The most elegant design can fail if it forces users to conform to the design rather than working within the blueprint of how humans perceive and process the world around them. This practical guide explains how you can apply key principles in psychology to build products and experiences that are more intuitive and human-centered. Author Jon Yablonski deconstructs familiar apps and experiences to provide clear examples of how UX designers can build experiences that adapt to how users perceive and process digital interfaces. You’ll learn: How aesthetically pleasing design creates positive responses The principles from psychology most useful for designers How these psychology principles relate to UX heuristics Predictive models including Fitts’s law, Jakob’s law, and Hick’s law Ethical implications of using psychology in design A framework for applying these principles |
| examples of folk psychology: The Handbook of Narrative and Psychotherapy Lynne E. Angus, John McLeod, 2004 The narrative turn in psychotherapy entails practitioners seeing their work as appreciating client stories and helping clients re-author their life stories. Twenty-one chapters, presented by Angus (York U., UK) and McLeod (U. of Abertay Dundee, UK) bring together different strands of thinking ab |
| examples of folk psychology: As If Kwame Anthony Appiah, 2017-08-14 “Appiah is a writer and thinker of remarkable range... [He] has packed into this short book an impressive amount of original reflection... A rich and illuminating book.” —Thomas Nagel, New York Review of Books Idealization is a fundamental feature of human thought. We build simplified models to make sense of the world, and life is a constant adjustment between the models we make and the realities we encounter. Our beliefs, desires, and sense of justice are bound up with these ideals, and we proceed “as if” our representations were true, while knowing they are not. In this elegant and original meditation, Kwame Anthony Appiah suggests that this instinct to idealize is not dangerous or distracting so much as it is necessary. As If explores how strategic untruth plays a critical role in far-flung areas of inquiry: decision theory, psychology, natural science, and political philosophy. A polymath who writes with mainstream clarity, Appiah defends the centrality of the imagination not just in the arts but in science, morality, and everyday life. “Appiah is the rare public intellectual who is also a first-rate analytic philosopher, and the characteristic virtues associated with each of these identities are very much in evidence throughout the book.” —Thomas Kelly, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews |
| examples of folk psychology: The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Literary Studies Lisa Zunshine, 2015 The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Literary Studies applies developments in cognitive science to a wide range of literary texts that span multiple historical periods and numerous national literary traditions. |
| examples of folk psychology: The Intentional Stance Daniel C. Dennett, 1989-03-06 How are we able to understand and anticipate each other in everyday life, in our daily interactions? Through the use of such folk concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, asserts Daniel Dennett in this first full-scale presentation of a theory of intentionality that he has been developing for almost twenty years. We adopt a stance, he argues, a predictive strategy of interpretation that presupposes the rationality of the people—or other entities—we are hoping to understand and predict. These principles of radical interpretation have far-reaching implications for the metaphysical and scientific status of the processes referred to by the everday terms of folk psychology and their corresponding terms in cognitive science.While Dennett's philosophical stance has been steadfast over the years, his views have undergone successive enrichments, refinements, and extensions. The Intentional Stance brings together both previously published and original material: four of the book's ten chapters—its first and the final three—appear here for the first time and push the theory into surprising new territory. The remaining six were published earlier in the 1980s but were not easily accessible; each is followed by a reflection—an essay reconsidering and extending the claims of the earlier work. These reflections and the new chapters represent the vanguard of Dennett's thought. They reveal fresh lines of inquiry into fundamental issues in psychology, artificial intelligence, and evolutionary theory as well as traditional issues in the philosophy of mind. A Bradford Book. |
| examples of folk psychology: What Emotions Really Are Paul E. Griffiths, 1997 Paul E. Griffiths argues that most research on the emotions has been as misguided as Aristotelian efforts to study superlunary objects - objects outside the moon's orbit. Such subjects exist, of course, but studying them as a group produces no useful results because they share no traits other than an arbitrarily defined location. Similarly, Griffiths show that emotion, as currently defined, groups together psychological states of very different, and thus not comparable, kinds. According to Griffiths, theoretical research on emotions took a wrong turn by not fully exploring the relevant empirical evidence. Griffiths provides a detailed overview of this material, drawing on ethology, evolutionary biology, neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and anthropology of the emotions. He identifies and assesses the relative merits of three main theoretical approaches - affect program theory, evolutionary psychology, and social constructionism. |
| examples of folk psychology: Plato's Camera Paul M. Churchland, 2012-01-20 A noted philosopher draws on the empirical results and conceptual resources of cognitive neuroscience to address questions about the nature of knowledge. In Plato's Camera, eminent philosopher Paul Churchland offers a novel account of how the brain constructs a representation—or takes a picture—of the universe's timeless categorical and dynamical structure. This construction process, which begins at birth, yields the enduring background conceptual framework with which we will interpret our sensory experience for the rest of our lives. But, as even Plato knew, to make singular perceptual judgments requires that we possess an antecedent framework of abstract categories to which any perceived particular can be relevantly assimilated. How that background framework is assembled in the first place is the motivating mystery, and the primary target, of Churchland's book. Unexpectedly, this neurobiologically grounded account of human cognition also provides a systematic story of how such low-level epistemological activities are integrated within an enveloping framework of linguistic structures and regulatory mechanisms at the social level. As Churchland illustrates, this integration of cognitive mechanisms at several levels has launched the human race on an epistemological adventure denied to all other terrestrial creatures. |
| examples of folk psychology: Consciousness from a Broad Perspective Anders Hedman, 2017-05-23 This volume offers an introduction to consciousness research within philosophy, psychology and neuroscience, from a philosophical perspective and with an emphasis on the history of ideas and core concepts. The book begins by examining consciousness as a modern mystery. Thereafter, the book introduces philosophy of mind and the mind-body problem, and proceeds to explore psychological, philosophical and neuroscientific approaches to mind and consciousness. The book then presents a discussion of mysterianist views of consciousness in response to what can be perceived as insurmountable scientific challenges to the problem of consciousness. As a response to mysterianist views, the next chapters examine radical approaches to rethinking the problem of consciousness, including externalist approaches. The final two chapters present the author’s personal view of the problem of consciousness. Consciousness remains a mystery for contemporary science—a mystery raising many questions. Why does consciousness persist as a mystery? Are we humans not intelligent enough to solve the riddle of consciousness? If we can solve this mystery, what would it take? What research would we need to conduct? Moreover, the mystery of consciousness prompts the larger question of how well the cognitive sciences have actually advanced our understanding of ourselves as human beings. After all, consciousness is not just a minor part of our existence. Without consciousness, we would not be human beings at all. This book aims to increase the accessibility of major ideas in the field of consciousness research and to inspire readers to contribute to the ongoing discussion of the place of consciousness in nature. |
| examples of folk psychology: The Great Mental Models, Volume 1 Shane Parrish, Rhiannon Beaubien, 2024-10-15 Discover the essential thinking tools you’ve been missing with The Great Mental Models series by Shane Parrish, New York Times bestselling author and the mind behind the acclaimed Farnam Street blog and “The Knowledge Project” podcast. This first book in the series is your guide to learning the crucial thinking tools nobody ever taught you. Time and time again, great thinkers such as Charlie Munger and Warren Buffett have credited their success to mental models–representations of how something works that can scale onto other fields. Mastering a small number of mental models enables you to rapidly grasp new information, identify patterns others miss, and avoid the common mistakes that hold people back. The Great Mental Models: Volume 1, General Thinking Concepts shows you how making a few tiny changes in the way you think can deliver big results. Drawing on examples from history, business, art, and science, this book details nine of the most versatile, all-purpose mental models you can use right away to improve your decision making and productivity. This book will teach you how to: Avoid blind spots when looking at problems. Find non-obvious solutions. Anticipate and achieve desired outcomes. Play to your strengths, avoid your weaknesses, … and more. The Great Mental Models series demystifies once elusive concepts and illuminates rich knowledge that traditional education overlooks. This series is the most comprehensive and accessible guide on using mental models to better understand our world, solve problems, and gain an advantage. |
| examples of folk psychology: The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality Angela A. Mendelovici, 2018 Mendelovici proposes a novel theory of intentionality in terms of phenomenal consciousness, arguing that the view avoids the problems of its competitors and can accommodate a wide range of cases, including those of thought and nonconscious states. |
| examples of folk psychology: The World in the Head Robert Cummins, 2010-01-28 The World in the Head collects the best of Robert Cummins' papers on mental representation and psychological explanation. Running through these papers are a pair of themes: that explaining the mind requires functional analysis, not subsumption under psychological laws, and that the propositional attitudes—belief, desire, intention—and their interactions, while real, are not the key to understanding the mind at a fundamental level. Taking these ideas seriously puts considerable strain on standard conceptions of rationality and reasoning, on truth-conditional semantics, and on our interpretation of experimental evidence concerning cognitive development, learning and the evolution of mental traits and processes. The temptation to read the structure of mental states and their interactions off the structure of human language is powerful and seductive, but has created a widening gap between what most philosophers and social scientists take for granted about the mind, and the framework we need to make sense what an accelerating biology and neuroscience are telling us about brains. The challenge for the philosophy of mind is to devise a framework that accommodates these developments. This is the underlying motivation for the papers in this collection. |
Examples - Apache ECharts
Apache ECharts，一款基于JavaScript的数据可视化图表库，提供直观，生动，可交互，可个性化定制的数据可视化图表。
Examples - Apache ECharts
Examples; Resources. Spread Sheet Tool; Theme Builder; Cheat Sheet; More Resources; Community. Events; Committers; Mailing List; How to Contribute; Dependencies; Code …
Examples - Apache ECharts
Examples; Resources. Spread Sheet Tool; Theme Builder; Cheat Sheet; More Resources; Community. Events; Committers; Mailing List; How to Contribute; Dependencies; Code …
Apache ECharts
ECharts: A Declarative Framework for Rapid Construction of Web-based Visualization. 如果您在科研项目、产品、学术论文、技术报告、新闻报告、教育、专利以及其他相关活动中使用了 …
Events - Apache ECharts
Examples; Resources. Spread Sheet Tool; Theme Builder; Cheat Sheet; More Resources; Community. Events; Committers; Mailing List; How to Contribute; Dependencies; Code …
Examples - Apache ECharts
Apache ECharts，一款基于JavaScript的数据可视化图表库，提供直观，生动，可交互，可个性化定制的数据可视化图表。
Examples - Apache ECharts
Examples; Resources. Spread Sheet Tool; Theme Builder; Cheat Sheet; More Resources; Community. Events; Committers; Mailing List; How to Contribute; Dependencies; Code …
Examples - Apache ECharts
Examples; Resources. Spread Sheet Tool; Theme Builder; Cheat Sheet; More Resources; Community. Events; Committers; Mailing List; How to Contribute; Dependencies; Code …
Apache ECharts
ECharts: A Declarative Framework for Rapid Construction of Web-based Visualization. 如果您在科研项目、产品、学术论文、技术报告、新闻报告、教育、专利以及其他相关活动中使用了 …
Events - Apache ECharts
Examples; Resources. Spread Sheet Tool; Theme Builder; Cheat Sheet; More Resources; Community. Events; Committers; Mailing List; How to Contribute; Dependencies; Code …
