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| examples of cartels in economics: How Cartels Endure and how They Fail Peter Z. Grossman, 2004-01-01 Why do some cartels fail and others succeed? This question has intrigued economists for a hundred years, and they have created an extensive body of theory to help explain cartel behaviour. This book looks at the experience of actual cartels and challenges their portrayal as found in the existing literature. The eleven chapters by leading researchers of industrial organization study real examples of industrial collusion. The authors investigate the formation, behaviour, activity and purpose of cartels, and illustrate the intricacies of collusive relationships. In the process they question the existing economic theory surrounding the operation of cartels, which in practice do not always adhere to the textbook models or to complex game theoretic rules. Although much economic research suggests that cartels are doomed to failure, the authors find that there are many examples of industries where cartels have succeeded in controlling prices and output over a prolonged period of time. The book is a groundbreaking attempt to study empirically a range of cartels throughout the world, providing both historical and contemporary examples of collusion to enrich the arguments. This book is written for academics, policymakers, lawyers and economists working in the fields of industrial organization and competition policy. |
| examples of cartels in economics: How Do Cartels Operate? Joseph Emmett Harrington, 2006 This paper distills and organizes facts about cartels from about 20 European Commission decisions over 2000-2004. It describes the properties of a collusive outcome in terms of the setting of price and a market allocation, monitoring of agreements with respect to price but more importantly sales, punishment methods for enforcing an agreement and also the use of buy-backs to compensate cartel members, methods for responding to external disruptions from non-cartel suppliers and handling over-zealous sales representatives, and operational procedures in terms of the frequency of meetings and the cartel's organizational structure. |
| examples of cartels in economics: Narconomics Tom Wainwright, 2016-02-23 Picking his way through Andean cocaine fields, Central American prisons, Colorado pot shops, and the online drug dens of the Dark Web, Tom Wainwright provides a fresh, innovative look into the drug trade and its 250 million customers. More than just an investigation of how drug cartels do business, Narconomics is also a blueprint for how to defeat them. How does a budding cartel boss succeed (and survive) in the 300 billion illegal drug business? By learning from the best, of course. From creating brand value to fine-tuning customer service, the folks running cartels have been attentive students of the strategy and tactics used by corporations such as Walmart, McDonald's, and Coca-Cola. And what can government learn to combat this scourge? By analyzing the cartels as companies, law enforcers might better understand how they work -- and stop throwing away 100 billion a year in a futile effort to win the war against this global, highly organized business. Your intrepid guide to the most exotic and brutal industry on earth is Tom Wainwright. Picking his way through Andean cocaine fields, Central American prisons, Colorado pot shops, and the online drug dens of the Dark Web, Wainwright provides a fresh, innovative look into the drug trade and its 250 million customers. The cast of characters includes Bin Laden, the Bolivian coca guide; Old Lin, the Salvadoran gang leader; Starboy, the millionaire New Zealand pill maker; and a cozy Mexican grandmother who cooks blueberry pancakes while plotting murder. Along with presidents, cops, and teenage hitmen, they explain such matters as the business purpose for head-to-toe tattoos, how gangs decide whether to compete or collude, and why cartels care a surprising amount about corporate social responsibility. More than just an investigation of how drug cartels do business, Narconomics is also a blueprint for how to defeat them. |
| examples of cartels in economics: Hub-and-Spoke Cartels Luke Garrod, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Matthew Olczak, 2021-11-16 The first comprehensive economic and legal analysis of hub-and-spoke cartels, with detailed case studies. A cartel forms when competitors conspire to limit competition through coordinated actions. Most cartels are composed exclusively of firms that would otherwise be in competition, but in a hub-and-spoke cartel, those competitors (“spokes”) conspire with the assistance of an upstream supplier or a downstream buyer (“hub”). This book provides the first comprehensive economic and legal analysis of hub-and-spoke cartels, explaining their formation and how they operate to create and sustain a collusive environment. Sixteen detailed case studies, including cases brought against toy manufacturer Hasbro and the Apple ebook case, illustrate the economic framework and legal strategies discussed. The authors identify three types of hub-and-spoke cartels: when an upstream firm facilitates downstream firms to coordinate on higher prices; when a downstream intermediary facilitates upstream suppliers to coordinate on higher prices; and when a downstream firm facilitates upstream suppliers to exclude a downstream rival. They devote a chapter to each type, discussing the formation, coordination, enforcement, efficacy, and prosecution of these cartels, and consider general lessons that can be drawn from the case studies. Finally, they present strategies for prosecuting hub-and-spoke collusion. The book is written to be accessible to both economists and lawyers, and is intended for both scholars and practitioners. |
| examples of cartels in economics: The Economics of Collusion Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx, 2012-04-27 An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts—fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases—offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entrée to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks. |
| examples of cartels in economics: The International Petroleum Cartel (reprint) United States. Federal Trade Commission, 1975 |
| examples of cartels in economics: The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics Roger D. Blair, D. Daniel Sokol, 2015 More than any other area of regulation, antitrust economics shapes law and policy in the United States, the Americas, Europe, and Asia. In a number of different areas of antitrust, advances in theory and empirical work have caused a fundamental reevaluation and shift of some of the assumptions behind antitrust policy. This reevaluation has profound implications for the future of the field. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics has collected chapters from many of the leading figures in antitrust. In doing so, this two volume Handbook provides an important reference guide for scholars, teachers, and practitioners. However, it is more than a merely reference guide. Rather, it has a number of different goals. First, it takes stock of the current state of scholarship across a number of different antitrust topics. In doing so, it relies primarily upon the economics scholarship. In some situations, though, there is also coverage of legal scholarship, case law developments, and legal policies. The second goal of the Handbook is to provide some ideas about future directions of antitrust scholarship and policy. Antitrust economics has evolved over the last 60 years. It has both shaped policy and been shaped by policy. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics will serve as a policy and research guide of next steps to consider when shaping the future of the field of antitrust. |
| examples of cartels in economics: Economics for Competition Lawyers Gunnar Niels, Helen Jenkins, James Kavanagh, 2011-04-07 Economics for Competition Lawyers provides a comprehensive explanation of the economic principles most relevant for competition law. Written specifically for competition lawyers, it uses real-world examples, is non-technical, and explains the key points from first principles. |
| examples of cartels in economics: Hard Core Cartels Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003-05-23 Anti-cartel measures seek to prevent violations of competition law such as agreements among competitors to fix prices, restrict product supply or submit collusive tenders. This report examines the harm caused by cartels and the progress made to strengthen methods of investigation and sanctions systems to tackle this problem. It also outlines and identifies the challenges that lie ahead. |
| examples of cartels in economics: Global Price Fixing John M. Connor, 2013-12-01 Some books get written, others write themselves. This book is the latter type. I have devoted myselfto studying the economic organization of industries related to food and agriculture for almost twenty-five years. It has been my good fortune to work at places that tolerated my gadfly approach to research. So long as I produced a few publications each year and wooed a few graduate students to share those interests, I was free to pursue an array of topics: why firms diversifY, the competitive role of advertising, strategies for selling in overseas markets, measuring market power, and many others. Although firmly anchored in the eclectic analytical framework of industrial economics and focused on the food system, I traversed a wide field at will. Some years ago, I had pretty much convinced myself that naked price fixing was not a high priority for scholarship in these industries. True, collusion was rife in a few food industries, such as bid-rigging among suppliers of fluid milk to school districts in isolated rural districts. Ripping off milk money from school children is reprehensible enough, but the size of the economic losses from localized price fixing paled besides other sources of imperfect competition. |
| examples of cartels in economics: International Cartels Ervin Paul Hexner, Adelaide Walters, 1971 |
| examples of cartels in economics: The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2017-11-16 A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion. |
| examples of cartels in economics: New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure International Economic Association, 1986 These contributions discuss a number of important developments over the past decade in a newly established and important field of economics that have led to notable changes in views on governmental competition policies. They focus on the nature and role of competition and other determinants of market structures, such as numbers of firms and barriers to entry; other factors which determine the effective degree of competition in the market; the influence of major firms (especially when these pursue objectives other than profit maximization); and decentralization and coordination under control relationships other than markets and hierarchies.ContributorsJoseph E. Stiglitz, G. C. Archibald, B. C. Eaton, R. G. Lipsey, David Enaoua, Paul Geroski, Alexis Jacquemin, Richard J. Gilbert, Reinhard Selten, Oliver E. Williamson, Jerry R. Green, G. Frank Mathewson, R. A. Winter, C. d'Aspremont, J. Jaskold Gabszewicz, Steven Salop, Branko Horvat, Z. Roman, W. J. Baumol, J. C. Panzar, R. D. Willig, Richard Schmalensee, Richard Nelson, Michael Scence, and Partha Dasgupta |
| examples of cartels in economics: The Informant Kurt Eichenwald, 2012-02-09 The Informant is Mark Whitacre, a senior executive with America's most powerful food giant, who put his career and his family's safety at risk to become a confidential government witness. Using Whitacre's secret recordings and a team of agents, the FBI uncovered the corporation's scheme to steal millions of dollars from its own customers. But as the FBI closed in on their target, they suddenly realized that Whitacre wasn't quite playing the game they'd thought ... This is the gripping account of how a corporate golden boy became an FBI mole and went on to double-cross both the authorities and his employers in one of the most extraordinary cases of global corporate corruption of the last thirty years. |
| examples of cartels in economics: The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management , 2018-05-04 The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management has been written by an international team of leading academics, practitioners and rising stars and contains almost 550 individually commissioned entries. It is the first resource of its kind to pull together such a comprehensive overview of the field and covers both the theoretical and more empirically/practitioner oriented side of the discipline. |
| examples of cartels in economics: Licensing Agreements Kojo Yelpaala, Donald R. Worley, Dennis Campbell, 1988-01-19 |
| examples of cartels in economics: Microeconomics: A Very Short Introduction Avinash Dixit, 2014-04-24 Microeconomics - individuals' choices of where to live and work, how much to save, what to buy, and firms' decisions about location, hiring, firing, and investment - involves issues that concern us on a daily basis. But when people think about economics, they tend to place importance on the bigger picture - macroeconomics - including issues such as unemployment, inflation, and the competitiveness of nations. In this Very Short Introduction, Avinash Dixit argues that the microeconomy has a large impact on the economic world, arguably as much as the issues of macroeconomics. Dixit steers a clear path through the huge number of issues related to microeconomics, explaining what happens when things go well, as well as showing how they fail, why that happens, and what can be done about it. Using real-life examples from around the world, using the minimum of mathematics and including simple graphs, he provides insights into economics from psychology and sociology to explain economic behaviour and rational choice. An ideal introduction for anyone interested in business and economics. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable. |
| examples of cartels in economics: Handbook of Antitrust Economics Paolo Buccirossi, 2008-03-21 Experts examine the application of economic theory to antitrust issues in both the United States and Europe, discussing mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance, and the impact of market features. Over the past twenty years, economic theory has begun to play a central role in antitrust matters. In earlier days, the application of antitrust rules was viewed almost entirely in formal terms; now it is widely accepted that the proper interpretation of these rules requires an understanding of how markets work and how firms can alter their efficient functioning. The Handbook of Antitrust Economics offers scholars, students, administrators, courts, companies, and lawyers the economist's view of the subject, describing the application of newly developed theoretical models and improved empirical methods to antitrust and competition law in both the United States and the European Union. (The book uses the U.S. term “antitrust law” and the European “competition law” interchangeably, emphasizing the commonalities between the two jurisdictions.) After a general discussion of the use of empirical methods in antitrust cases, the Handbook covers mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance (or unilateral conducts), and market features that affect the way firms compete. Chapters examine such topics as analyzing the competitive effects of both horizontal and vertical mergers, detecting and preventing cartels, theoretical and empirical analysis of vertical restraints, state aids, the relationship of competition law to the defense of intellectual property, and the application of antitrust law to “bidding markets,” network industries, and two-sided markets. Contributors Mark Armstrong, Jonathan B. Baker, Timothy F. Bresnahan, Paulo Buccirossi, Nicholas Economides, Hans W. Friederiszick, Luke M. Froeb, Richard J. Gilbert, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Paul Klemperer, Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Francine Lafontaine, Damien J. Neven, Patrick Rey, Michael H. Riordan, Jean-Charles Rochet, Lars-Hendrick Röller, Margaret Slade, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Jean Tirole, Thibaud Vergé, Vincent Verouden, John Vickers, Gregory J. Werden |
| examples of cartels in economics: Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Centre for Co-operation with European Economies in Transition, 1993 |
| examples of cartels in economics: Monopolized David Dayen, 2020-06-09 From the airlines we fly to the food we eat, how a tiny group of corporations have come to dominate every aspect of our lives—by one of our most intrepid and accomplished journalists If you're looking for a book . . . that will get your heart pumping and your blood boiling and that will remind you why we're in these fights—add this one to your list. —Senator Elizabeth Warren on David Dayen's Chain of Title Over the last forty years our choices have narrowed, our opportunities have shrunk, and our lives have become governed by a handful of very large and very powerful corporations. Today, practically everything we buy, everywhere we shop, and every service we secure comes from a heavily concentrated market. This is a world where four major banks control most of our money, four airlines shuttle most of us around the country, and four major cell phone providers connect most of our communications. If you are sick you can go to one of three main pharmacies to fill your prescription, and if you end up in a hospital almost every accessory to heal you comes from one of a handful of large medical suppliers. Dayen, the editor of the American Prospect and author of the acclaimed Chain of Title, provides a riveting account of what it means to live in this new age of monopoly and how we might resist this corporate hegemony. Through vignettes and vivid case studies Dayen shows how these monopolies have transformed us, inverted us, and truly changed our lives, at the same time providing readers with the raw material to make monopoly a consequential issue in American life and revive a long-dormant antitrust movement. |
| examples of cartels in economics: Report to the Federal Trade Commission United States. Federal Trade Commission. Advisory Committee on Cost Justification, 1956 |
| examples of cartels in economics: Good Economics for Hard Times Abhijit V. Banerjee, Esther Duflo, 2019-11-12 The winners of the Nobel Prize show how economics, when done right, can help us solve the thorniest social and political problems of our day. Figuring out how to deal with today's critical economic problems is perhaps the great challenge of our time. Much greater than space travel or perhaps even the next revolutionary medical breakthrough, what is at stake is the whole idea of the good life as we have known it. Immigration and inequality, globalization and technological disruption, slowing growth and accelerating climate change--these are sources of great anxiety across the world, from New Delhi and Dakar to Paris and Washington, DC. The resources to address these challenges are there--what we lack are ideas that will help us jump the wall of disagreement and distrust that divides us. If we succeed, history will remember our era with gratitude; if we fail, the potential losses are incalculable. In this revolutionary book, renowned MIT economists Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo take on this challenge, building on cutting-edge research in economics explained with lucidity and grace. Original, provocative, and urgent, Good Economics for Hard Times makes a persuasive case for an intelligent interventionism and a society built on compassion and respect. It is an extraordinary achievement, one that shines a light to help us appreciate and understand our precariously balanced world. |
| examples of cartels in economics: Cases in European Competition Policy Bruce Lyons, 2009-08-27 Competition between firms is usually the most effective way of delivering economic efficiency and what consumers want. However, there is a balance to be struck. Firms must not be over-regulated and so hampered in their development of innovative products and new strategies to compete for customers. Nor must they be completely free to satisfy a natural preference for monopoly, which would give them higher profits and a quieter life. The economic role of competition policy (control of anticompetitive agreements, mergers and abusive practices) is to maintain this balance, and an effective policy requires a nuanced understanding of the economics of industrial organization. Cases in European Competition Policy demonstrates how economics is used (and sometimes abused) in competition cases in practical competition policy across Europe. Each chapter summarizes a real case investigated by the European Commission or a national authority, and provides a critique of key aspects of the economic analysis. |
| examples of cartels in economics: Competition Among the Few William John 1905- Fellner, 2021-09-10 This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. |
| examples of cartels in economics: All Honorable Men James Stewart Martin, 2016-05-17 A scathing attack on Wall Street’s illegal ties to Nazi Germany before WWII—and the postwar whitewashing of Nazi business leaders by the US government Prior to World War II, German industry was controlled by an elite group who had used their money and influence to help bring the Nazi Party to power. After the Allies had successfully occupied Germany and removed the Third Reich, the process of reconstructing the devastated nation’s economy began under supervision of the US government. James Stewart Martin, who had assisted the Allied forces in targeting key areas of German industry for aerial bombardment, returned to Germany as the director of the Division for Investigation of Cartels and External Assets in American Military Government, a position he held until 1947. Martin was to break up the industrial machine these cartels controlled and investigate their ties to Wall Street. What he discovered was shocking. Many American corporations had done business with German corporations who helped fund the Nazi Party, despite knowing what their money was supporting. Effectively, Wall Street’s greed had led them to aid Hitler and hinder the Allied effort. Martin’s efforts at decartelization were unsuccessful though, largely due to hindrance from his superior officer, an investment banker in peacetime. In conclusion, he said, “We had not been stopped in Germany by German business. We had been stopped in Germany by American business.” This exposé on economic warfare, Wall Street, and America’s military industrial complex includes a new introduction by Christopher Simpson, author of Blowback:America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Destructive Impact on Our Domestic and Foreign Policy, and a new foreword from investigative journalist Hank Albarelli. |
| examples of cartels in economics: International Shipping Cartels Daniel Marx, 1969 |
| examples of cartels in economics: The Oxford Handbook of Business History Geoffrey Jones, Jonathan Zeitlin, 2008-01-25 This Handbook provides a state-of-the-art survey of research in business history. Business historians study the historical evolution of business systems, entrepreneurs and firms, as well as their interaction with their political, economic, and social environment. They address issues of central concern to researchers in management studies and business administration, as well as economics, sociology and political science, and to historians. They employ a range of qualitative and quantitative methodologies, but all share a belief in the importance of understanding change over time. The Oxford Handbook of Business History has brought together leading scholars to provide a comprehensive, critical, and interdisciplinary examination of business history, organized into four parts: Approaches and Debates; Forms of Business Organization; Functions of Enterprise; and Enterprise and Society. The Handbook shows that business history is a wide-ranging and dynamic area of study, generating compelling empirical data, which has sometimes confirmed and sometimes contested widely-held views in management and the social sciences. The Oxford Handbook of Business History is a key reference work for scholars and advanced students of Business History, and a fascinating resource for social scientists in general. |
| examples of cartels in economics: Competition Policy Massimo Motta, 2004-01-12 This is the first book to provide a systematic treatment of the economics of antitrust (or competition policy) in a global context. It draws on the literature of industrial organisation and on original analyses to deal with such important issues as cartels, joint-ventures, mergers, vertical contracts, predatory pricing, exclusionary practices, and price discrimination, and to formulate policy implications on these issues. The interaction between theory and practice is one of the main features of the book, which contains frequent references to competition policy cases and a few fully developed case studies. The treatment is written to appeal to practitioners and students, to lawyers and economists. It is not only a textbook in economics for first year graduate or advanced undergraduate courses, but also a book for all those who wish to understand competition issues in a clear and rigorous way. Exercises and some solved problems are provided. |
| examples of cartels in economics: The Regulated Economy Claudia Goldin, Gary D. Libecap, 2008-04-15 How has the United States government grown? What political and economic factors have given rise to its regulation of the economy? These eight case studies explore the late-nineteenth- and early twentieth-century origins of government intervention in the United States economy, focusing on the political influence of special interest groups in the development of economic regulation. The Regulated Economy examines how constituent groups emerged and demanded government action to solve perceived economic problems, such as exorbitant railroad and utility rates, bank failure, falling agricultural prices, the immigration of low-skilled workers, workplace injury, and the financing of government. The contributors look at how preexisting policies, institutions, and market structures shaped regulatory activity; the origins of regulatory movements at the state and local levels; the effects of consensus-building on the timing and content of legislation; and how well government policies reflect constituency interests. A wide-ranging historical view of the way interest group demands and political bargaining have influenced the growth of economic regulation in the United States, this book is important reading for economists, political scientists, and public policy experts. |
| examples of cartels in economics: Cartels, Markets and Crime Bruce Wardhaugh, 2014-02-06 A study of the normative justification for criminalising cartel activity which goes beyond historical accounts of the topic. |
| examples of cartels in economics: Virtual Competition Ariel Ezrachi, Maurice E. Stucke, 2016-11-14 “A fascinating book about how platform internet companies (Amazon, Facebook, and so on) are changing the norms of economic competition.” —Fast Company Shoppers with a bargain-hunting impulse and internet access can find a universe of products at their fingertips. But is there a dark side to internet commerce? This thought-provoking exposé invites us to explore how sophisticated algorithms and data-crunching are changing the nature of market competition, and not always for the better. Introducing into the policy lexicon terms such as algorithmic collusion, behavioral discrimination, and super-platforms, Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E. Stucke explore the resulting impact on competition, our democratic ideals, our wallets, and our well-being. “We owe the authors our deep gratitude for anticipating and explaining the consequences of living in a world in which black boxes collude and leave no trails behind. They make it clear that in a world of big data and algorithmic pricing, consumers are outgunned and antitrust laws are outdated, especially in the United States.” —Science “A convincing argument that there can be a darker side to the growth of digital commerce. The replacement of the invisible hand of competition by the digitized hand of internet commerce can give rise to anticompetitive behavior that the competition authorities are ill equipped to deal with.” —Burton G. Malkiel, Wall Street Journal “A convincing case for the need to rethink competition law to cope with algorithmic capitalism’s potential for malfeasance.” —John Naughton, The Observer |
| examples of cartels in economics: Cartels and Economic Collusion Michael A. Utton, 2011-01-01 Adam Smith warned of the prevalence of corporate conspiracies more than two hundred years ago. Since then, interest in cartels has sometimes intensified (during the Great Depression, for example) and sometimes diminished, but the need for control has always remained on the antitrust agenda. This well-documented book reviews the economic case against corporate collusion, as well as the arguments made for a more permissive attitude. A survey of recent empirical research reveals not only the prevalence of a wide range of international cartels but also the size of the inefficiencies and costs that they impose on customers and consumers. The antitrust reaction has therefore intensified with greatly increased fines being imposed by the US, the EU and other authorities. At the same time, they have developed sophisticated leniency polices with the aim of destabilizing the illegal conspiracies. After reviewing these measures, the author concludes with the hope that this toughened approach is not modified or reversed during periods of recession. |
| examples of cartels in economics: The Business of Genocide Michael Thad Allen, 2005-02-01 Examines the Business Administration Main Office of the SS, which built up the slave-labor system in Nazi concentration camps. |
| examples of cartels in economics: Aspects of Labor Economics Universities--National Bureau Committee for Economic Research, Universities--National Bureau Committee for Economic Research. Conference, 1975 |
| examples of cartels in economics: The Organisation of Knowledge in Victorian Britain Martin Daunton, 2005-05-26 This collection of essays explores the questions of what counted as knowledge in Victorian Britain, who defined knowledge and the knowledgeable, by what means and by what criteria. During the Victorian period, the structure of knowledge took on a new and recognizably modern form, and the disciplines we now take for granted took shape. The ways in which knowledge was tested also took on a new form, with the rise of written examinations. New institutions of knowledge were created: museums were important at the start of the period, universities had become prominent by the end. Victorians needed to make sense of the sheer scale of new information, to popularize it, and at the same time to exclude ignorance and error - a role carried out by encyclopaedias and popular publications. By studying the Victorian organization of knowledge in its institutional, social, and intellectual settings, these essays contribute to our wider consideration of the complex and much debated concept of knowledge. |
| examples of cartels in economics: The Economics of Resale Price Maintenance Basil S. Yamey, 1954 |
| examples of cartels in economics: Antitrust Economics Roger D. Blair, David L. Kaserman, 2009 This book provides a thorough treatment of the economic theory that guides and motivates the design and enforcement of American antitrust laws. Along with a comprehensive analysis of both horizontal and vertical antitrust issues, economic theory is used to evaluate antitrust policy through theexamination of relevant legislation and landmark cases. Theory is discussed through its relation to policy issues, and in turn, the role of theory in the development of new policy is examined. |
| examples of cartels in economics: The Impact of Cartels on National Economy and Competitiveness Jurgita Bruneckienė, Irena Pekarskienė, Andrius Guzavičius, Oksana Palekienė, Jūratė Šovienė, 2015-06-09 The book presents theoretical and empirical research on the integrated assessment of cartels’ effects on national economies. The empirical analysis is based on three cases in Lithuania, a country chosen because it corresponds to the features of a small economy with a developing culture of competition. An integrated assessment of a cartel’s impact by measuring the net economic effect created by its operations on the market is extremely important at the scale of national economies. If a cartel’s true impact is not identified and evaluated, it is impossible to make important strategic decisions, for the whole economy instead of individual affected parties and to establish an optimum baseline for mitigating the harm done to the economy. Thus, an integrated cartel impact assessment can help to more proactively combat cartel agreements on the market and improve the economic welfare of the respective country. |
| examples of cartels in economics: Essential Economics Matthew Bishop, 2004-05-01 |
| examples of cartels in economics: Lectures on Antitrust Economics Michael Dennis Whinston, 2006 Antitrust law regulates economic activity but differs in its operation from what is traditionally considered regulation. Where regulation is often industry-specific and involves the direct setting of prices, product characteristics, or entry, antitrust law focuses more broadly on maintaining certain basic rules of competition. In these lectures Michael Whinston offers an accessible and lucid account of the economics behind antitrust law, looking at some of the most recent developments in antitrust economics and highlighting areas that require further research. He focuses on three areas: price fixing, in which competitors agree to restrict output or raise price; horizontal mergers, in which competitors agree to merge their operations; and exclusionary vertical contracts, in which a competitor seeks to exclude a rival. Antitrust commentators widely regard the prohibition on price fixing as the most settled and economically sound area of antitrust. Whinston's discussion seeks to unsettle this view, suggesting that some fundamental issues in this area are, in fact, not well understood. In his discussion of horizontal mergers, Whinston describes the substantial advances in recent theoretical and empirical work and suggests fruitful directions for further research. The complex area of exclusionary vertical contracts is perhaps the most controversial in antitrust. The influential Chicago School cast doubt on arguments that vertical contracts could be profitably used to exclude rivals. Recent theoretical work, to which Whinston has made important contributions, instead shows that such contracts can be profitable tools for exclusion. Whinston's discussion sheds light on the controversy in this area and the nature of those recent theoretical contributions. Sponsored by the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella |
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Examples; Resources. Spread Sheet Tool; Theme Builder; Cheat Sheet; More Resources; Community. Events; …
Examples - Apache ECharts
Examples; Resources. Spread Sheet Tool; Theme Builder; Cheat Sheet; More Resources; Community. Events; …
Apache ECharts
ECharts: A Declarative Framework for Rapid Construction of Web-based Visualization. 如果您在科研项目、产品、 …
Events - Apache ECharts
Examples; Resources. Spread Sheet Tool; Theme Builder; Cheat Sheet; More Resources; Community. Events; …
Examples - Apache ECharts
Apache ECharts，一款基于JavaScript的数据可视化图表库，提供直观，生动，可交互，可个性化定制的数据可视化图表。
Examples - Apache ECharts
Examples; Resources. Spread Sheet Tool; Theme Builder; Cheat Sheet; More Resources; Community. Events; Committers; Mailing List; How to Contribute; Dependencies; Code …
Examples - Apache ECharts
Examples; Resources. Spread Sheet Tool; Theme Builder; Cheat Sheet; More Resources; Community. Events; Committers; Mailing List; How to Contribute; Dependencies; Code …
Apache ECharts
ECharts: A Declarative Framework for Rapid Construction of Web-based Visualization. 如果您在科研项目、产品、学术论文、技术报告、新闻报告、教育、专利以及其他相关活动中使用了 …
Events - Apache ECharts
Examples; Resources. Spread Sheet Tool; Theme Builder; Cheat Sheet; More Resources; Community. Events; Committers; Mailing List; How to Contribute; Dependencies; Code …
Examples - Apache ECharts
Apache ECharts，一款基于JavaScript的数据可视化图表库，提供直观，生动，可交互，可个性化定制的数据可视化图表。
Examples - Apache ECharts
Examples; Resources. Spread Sheet Tool; Theme Builder; Cheat Sheet; More Resources; Community. Events; Committers; Mailing List; How to Contribute; Dependencies; Code …
Examples - Apache ECharts
Examples; Resources. Spread Sheet Tool; Theme Builder; Cheat Sheet; More Resources; Community. Events; Committers; Mailing List; How to Contribute; Dependencies; Code …
Apache ECharts
ECharts: A Declarative Framework for Rapid Construction of Web-based Visualization. 如果您在科研项目、产品、学术论文、技术报告、新闻报告、教育、专利以及其他相关活动中使用了 …
Events - Apache ECharts
Examples; Resources. Spread Sheet Tool; Theme Builder; Cheat Sheet; More Resources; Community. Events; Committers; Mailing List; How to Contribute; Dependencies; Code …
