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| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions Anne Runehov, Lluis Oviedo, 2013-05-18 To all who love the God with a 1000 names and respect science” In the last quarter century, the academic field of Science and Theology (Religion) has attracted scholars from a wide variety of disciplines. The question is, which disciplines are attracted and what do these disciplines have to contribute to the debate? In order to answer this question, the encyclopedia maps the (self)-identified disciplines and religious traditions that participate or might come to participate in the Science and Religion debate. This is done by letting each representative of a discipline and tradition answer specific chosen questions. They also need to identify the discipline in relation to the Science and Religion debate. Understandably representatives of several disciplines and traditions answered in the negative to this question. Nevertheless, they can still be important for the debate; indeed, scholars and scientists who work in the field of Science and Theology (Religion) may need knowledge beyond their own specific discipline. Therefore the encyclopedia also includes what are called general entries. Such entries may explain specific theories, methods, and topics. The general aim is to provide a starting point for new lines of inquiry. It is an invitation for fresh perspectives on the possibilities for engagement between and across sciences (again which includes the social and human sciences) and religions and theology. This encyclopedia is a comprehensive reference work for scholars interested in the topic of ‘Science and Religion.’ It covers the widest spectrum possible of academic disciplines and religious traditions worldwide, with the intent of laying bare similarities and differences that naturally emerge within and across disciplines and religions today. The A–Z format throughout affords easy and user-friendly access to relevant information. Additionally, a systematic question-answer format across all Sciences and Religions entries affords efficient identification of specific points of agreement, conflict, and disinterest across and between sciences and religions. The extensive cross-referencing between key words, phrases, and technical language used in the entries facilitates easy searches. We trust that all of the entries have something of value for any interested reader. Anne L.C. Runehov and Lluis Oviedo |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Mind in a Physical World Jaegwon Kim, 2000 This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind--in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind--in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. Kim construes the mind-body problem as that of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical. Among other points, he redefines the roles of supervenience and emergence in the discussion of the mind-body problem. Arguing that various contemporary accounts of mental causation are inadequate, he offers his own partially reductionist solution on the basis of a novel model of reduction. Retaining the informal tone of the lecture format, the book is clear yet sophisticated. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Readings in Philosophy of Psychology Ned Joel Block, 1981 |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Physicalism Deconstructed Kevin Morris, 2019 Provides a philosophical and historical critique of contemporary conceptions of physicalism, especially non-reductive, levels-based approaches to physicalist metaphysics. Challenging assumptions about the mind-body problem, this accessible book will interest scholars working in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Physicalism K. V. Wilkes, 2014-11-20 The primary aim of this study is to dissolve the mind-body problem. It shows how the ‘problem’ separates into two distinct sets of issues, concerning ontology on the one hand, and explanation on the other, and argues that explanation – whether or not human behaviour can be explained in physical terms – is the more crucial. The author contends that a functionalist methodology in psychology and neurophysiology will prove adequate to explain human behaviour. Defence of this thesis requires: an examination of the mental/physical dichotomy, and its rejection in favour of a distinction between psychological and physical terms; a description and discussion of functionalism in psychology and neurophysiology, showing how the notorious problem of the necessary intensionality of psychological terms may be circumvented; an examination of the role of computer simulation in psycho-physical research; and an explanation of how the phenomena of sentience fit the functional framework. The book concludes that the thesis presented is in all essentials that of Aristotle; Aristotle had no ‘mind-body problem’, and were it not for a subsequent over-obsession with Cartesian scepticism, we need not have had one either. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Theories of Mind Maureen Eckert, 2006 Suitable for introductory classes focusing on philosophy of mind, this work includes readings from primary sources. It focuses on various examples and counter-examples, and meets the needs of instructors concerned with assigning primary source material that can serve as a foundation for more advanced studies in philosophy. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Aping Mankind Raymond Tallis, 2016-04-14 Neuroscience has made astounding progress in the understanding of the brain. What should we make of its claims to go beyond the brain and explain consciousness, behaviour and culture? Where should we draw the line? In this brilliant critique Raymond Tallis dismantles Neuromania, arising out of the idea that we are reducible to our brains and Darwinitis according to which, since the brain is an evolved organ, we are entirely explicable within an evolutionary framework. With precision and acuity he argues that the belief that human beings can be understood in biological terms is a serious obstacle to clear thinking about what we are and what we might become. Neuromania and Darwinitis deny human uniqueness, minimise the differences between us and our nearest animal kin and offer a grotesquely simplified account of humanity. We are, argues Tallis, infinitely more interesting and complex than we appear in the mirror of biology. Combative, fearless and thought-provoking, Aping Mankind is an important book and one that scientists, cultural commentators and policy-makers cannot ignore. This Routledge Classics edition includes a new preface by the Author. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: The Mind-Body Problem Jonathan Westphal, 2016-09-30 An introduction to the mind–body problem, covering all the proposed solutions and offering a powerful new one. Philosophers from Descartes to Kripke have struggled with the glittering prize of modern and contemporary philosophy: the mind-body problem. The brain is physical. If the mind is physical, we cannot see how. If we cannot see how the mind is physical, we cannot see how it can interact with the body. And if the mind is not physical, it cannot interact with the body. Or so it seems. In this book the philosopher Jonathan Westphal examines the mind-body problem in detail, laying out the reasoning behind the solutions that have been offered in the past and presenting his own proposal. The sharp focus on the mind-body problem, a problem that is not about the self, or consciousness, or the soul, or anything other than the mind and the body, helps clarify both problem and solutions. Westphal outlines the history of the mind-body problem, beginning with Descartes. He describes mind-body dualism, which claims that the mind and the body are two different and separate things, nonphysical and physical, and he also examines physicalist theories of mind; antimaterialism, which proposes limits to physicalism and introduces the idea of qualia; and scientific theories of consciousness. Finally, Westphal examines the largely forgotten neutral monist theories of mind and body, held by Ernst Mach, William James, and Bertrand Russell, which attempt neither to extract mind from matter nor to dissolve matter into mind. Westphal proposes his own version of neutral monism. This version is unique among neutral monist theories in offering an account of mind-body interaction. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Physical Realization Sydney Shoemaker, 2007-07-19 How can physicalism be true? How can all facts about the world be constituted by facts about the distribution in the world of physical properties? Shoemaker's answer to this question involves showing how the mental properties of a person can be 'realised' in the physical properties of that person. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Consciousness Jeffrey Alan Gray, 2004 How does conscious experience arise out of the functioning of the human brain? How is it related to the behaviour that it accompanies? How does the perceived world relate to the real world? Between them, these three questions constitute what is commonly known as the Hard Problem of consciousness. Despite vast knowledge of the relationship between brain and behaviour, and rapid advances in our knowledge of how brain activity correlates with conscious experience, the answers to all three questions remain controversial, even mysterious. This important new book analyses these core issues and reviews the evidence from both introspection and experiment. To many its conclusions will be surprising and even unsettling: · The entire perceived world is constructed by the brain. The relationship between the world we perceive and the underlying physical reality is not as close as we might think. · Much of our behaviour is accomplished with little or no participation from conscious experience. · Our conscious experience of our behaviour lags the behaviour itself by around a fifth of a second - we become aware of what we do only after we have done it. · The lag in conscious experience applies also to the decision to act - we only become aware of our decisions after they have been formed. · The self is as much a creation of the brain as is the rest of the perceived world. Written by a leading scientist, this analysis of how conscious experience relates to brain and behaviour is accessible and compelling. It will have major implications for our understanding of human nature. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind Anthony O'Hear, 1998-11-13 This book presents key issues in the philosophy of mind, examined by leading figures in the field. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience M. R. Bennett, P. M. S. Hacker, 2022-03-14 The second edition of the seminal work in the field—revised, updated, and extended In Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker outline and address the conceptual confusions encountered in various neuroscientific and psychological theories. The result of a collaboration between an esteemed philosopher and a distinguished neuroscientist, this remarkable volume presents an interdisciplinary critique of many of the neuroscientific and psychological foundations of modern cognitive neuroscience. The authors point out conceptual entanglements in a broad range of major neuroscientific and psychological theories—including those of such neuroscientists as Blakemore, Crick, Damasio, Dehaene, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Kandel, Kosslyn, LeDoux, Libet, Penrose, Posner, Raichle and Tononi, as well as psychologists such as Baar, Frith, Glynn, Gregory, William James, Weiskrantz, and biologists such as Dawkins, Humphreys, and Young. Confusions arising from the work of philosophers such as Dennett, Chalmers, Churchland, Nagel and Searle are subjected to detailed criticism. These criticisms are complemented by constructive analyses of the major cognitive, cogitative, emotional and volitional attributes that lie at the heart of cognitive neuroscientific research. Now in its second edition, this groundbreaking work has been exhaustively revised and updated to address current issues and critiques. New discussions offer insight into functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), the notions of information and representation, conflict monitoring and the executive, minimal states of consciousness, integrated information theory and global workspace theory. The authors also reply to criticisms of the fundamental arguments posed in the first edition, defending their conclusions regarding mereological fallacy, the necessity of distinguishing between empirical and conceptual questions, the mind-body problem, and more. Essential as both a comprehensive reference work and as an up-to-date critical review of cognitive neuroscience, this landmark volume: Provides a scientifically and philosophically informed survey of the conceptual problems in a wide variety of neuroscientific theories Offers a clear and accessible presentation of the subject, minimizing the use of complex philosophical and scientific jargon Discusses how the ways the brain relates to the mind affect the intelligibility of neuroscientific research Includes fresh insights on mind-body and mind-brain relations, and on the relation between the notion of person and human being Features more than 100 new pages and a wealth of additional diagrams, charts, and tables Continuing to challenge and educate readers like no other book on the subject, the second edition of Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience is required reading not only for neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers, but also for academics, researchers, and students involved in the study of the mind and consciousness. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Physicalism K. V. Wilkes, 2014-11-20 The primary aim of this study is to dissolve the mind-body problem. It shows how the ‘problem’ separates into two distinct sets of issues, concerning ontology on the one hand, and explanation on the other, and argues that explanation – whether or not human behaviour can be explained in physical terms – is the more crucial. The author contends that a functionalist methodology in psychology and neurophysiology will prove adequate to explain human behaviour. Defence of this thesis requires: an examination of the mental/physical dichotomy, and its rejection in favour of a distinction between psychological and physical terms; a description and discussion of functionalism in psychology and neurophysiology, showing how the notorious problem of the necessary intensionality of psychological terms may be circumvented; an examination of the role of computer simulation in psycho-physical research; and an explanation of how the phenomena of sentience fit the functional framework. The book concludes that the thesis presented is in all essentials that of Aristotle; Aristotle had no ‘mind-body problem’, and were it not for a subsequent over-obsession with Cartesian scepticism, we need not have had one either. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Sweet Dreams Daniel C. Dennett, 2006-09-08 In the years since Daniel Dennett's influential Consciousness Explained was published in 1991, scientific research on consciousness has been a hotly contested battleground of rival theories—so rambunctious, Dennett observes, that several people are writing books just about the tumult. With Sweet Dreams, Dennett returns to the subject for revision and renewal of his theory of consciousness, taking into account major empirical advances in the field since 1991 as well as recent theoretical challenges. In Consciousness Explained, Dennett proposed to replace the ubiquitous but bankrupt Cartesian Theater model (which posits a privileged place in the brain where it all comes together for the magic show of consciousness) with the Multiple Drafts Model. Drawing on psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, he asserted that human consciousness is essentially the mental software that reorganizes the functional architecture of the brain. In Sweet Dreams, he recasts the Multiple Drafts Model as the fame in the brain model, as a background against which to examine the philosophical issues that continue to bedevil the field. With his usual clarity and brio, Dennett enlivens his arguments with a variety of vivid examples. He isolates the Zombic Hunch that distorts much of the theorizing of both philosophers and scientists, and defends heterophenomenology, his third-person approach to the science of consciousness, against persistent misinterpretations and objections. The old challenge of Frank Jackson's thought experiment about Mary the color scientist is given a new rebuttal in the form of RoboMary, while his discussion of a famous card trick, The Tuned Deck, is designed to show that David Chalmers's Hard Problem is probably just a figment of theorists' misexploited imagination. In the final essay, the intrinsic nature of qualia is compared with the naively imagined intrinsic value of a dollar in Consciousness—How Much is That in Real Money? |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: The Multiple Realization Book Thomas W. Polger, Lawrence A. Shapiro, 2016 Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro offer the first full investigation of multiple realization--the idea that minds can be realized in ways other than the human brain. They cast doubt on the hypothesis and offer an alternative framework for understanding explanations in the cognitive sciences, and in chemistry, biology, and related fields. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: The Evolution of the Sensitive Soul Simona Ginsburg, Eva Jablonka, 2019-03-12 A new theory about the origins of consciousness that finds learning to be the driving force in the evolutionary transition to basic consciousness. What marked the evolutionary transition from organisms that lacked consciousness to those with consciousness—to minimal subjective experiencing, or, as Aristotle described it, “the sensitive soul”? In this book, Simona Ginsburg and Eva Jablonka propose a new theory about the origin of consciousness that finds learning to be the driving force in the transition to basic consciousness. Using a methodology similar to that used by scientists when they identified the transition from non-life to life, Ginsburg and Jablonka suggest a set of criteria, identify a marker for the transition to minimal consciousness, and explore the far-reaching biological, psychological, and philosophical implications. After presenting the historical, neurobiological, and philosophical foundations of their analysis, Ginsburg and Jablonka propose that the evolutionary marker of basic or minimal consciousness is a complex form of associative learning, which they term unlimited associative learning (UAL). UAL enables an organism to ascribe motivational value to a novel, compound, non-reflex-inducing stimulus or action, and use it as the basis for future learning. Associative learning, Ginsburg and Jablonka argue, drove the Cambrian explosion and its massive diversification of organisms. Finally, Ginsburg and Jablonka propose symbolic language as a similar type of marker for the evolutionary transition to human rationality—to Aristotle's “rational soul.” |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Mind and Body Robert Kirk, 2014-12-18 A great deal of work in philosophy today is concerned with some aspect of the complex tangle of problems and puzzles roughly labelled the mind-body problem. This book is an introduction to it. It is a readable, lucid and accessible guide that provides readers with authoritative exposition, and a solid and reliable framework which can be built on as needed. The first chapter briefly introduces the subject and moves on to discuss mechanism - the idea that minds are machines - focusing on Searle's Chinese Room argument. The next three chapters discuss dualism, physicalism, and some hard problems for physicalism, especially those concerning phenomenal consciousness. Chapters on behaviourism and functionalism follow. The central mind-body topics are then each given deeper consideration in separate chapters. Intentionality is investigated via Fodor's doctrine of the Language of Thought, taking account of connectionism. The main theories of consciousness are examined and the author's own approach outlined. The concluding chapter briefly resumes the theme of psychological explanation, linking it to further topics. Each chapter ends with a summary of the main points together with suggestions for further reading. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: The Philosophy of Mind Peter Smith, O. R. Jones, 1986-10 A clear introduction to the main issues arising in the philosophy of the mind is provided through this straightforward elementary textbook for beginning students of philosophy. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Readings in Philosophy of Psychology Ned Block, 1980 Essays discuss behaviorism, reductionism, physicalism, functionalism, the nature of mental states, and the foundations of psychoanalysis. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Theory of Perception George Pitcher, 2015-03-08 Presented here in a lucid, simple style is an extended defense of a behavioral and direct-realist theory of sense perception. Originally published in 1971. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: The Enigma of the Mind Sergio Moravia, 1995-01-27 Sergio Moravia's The Enigma of the Mind (originally published in Italian as L'enigma della mente) offers a broad and lucid critical and historical survey of one of the fundamental debates in the philosophy of mind - the relationship of mind and body. This problem continues to raise deep questions concerning the nature of man. The book has two central aims. First, Professor Moravia sketches the major recent contributions to the mind/body problem from philosophers of mind. Having established this framework Professor Moravia pursues his second aim - the articulation of a particular interpretation of the mental and the mind-body problem. The book's detailed and systematic treatment of this fundamental philosophical issue make it ideal for upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. It should also prove provocative reading for psychologists and cognitive scientists. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Mind and Body Robert Kirk, 2014-12-18 A great deal of work in philosophy today is concerned with some aspect of the complex tangle of problems and puzzles roughly labelled the mind-body problem. This book is an introduction to it. It is a readable, lucid and accessible guide that provides readers with authoritative exposition, and a solid and reliable framework which can be built on as needed. The first chapter briefly introduces the subject and moves on to discuss mechanism - the idea that minds are machines - focusing on Searle's Chinese Room argument. The next three chapters discuss dualism, physicalism, and some hard problems for physicalism, especially those concerning phenomenal consciousness. Chapters on behaviourism and functionalism follow. The central mind-body topics are then each given deeper consideration in separate chapters. Intentionality is investigated via Fodor's doctrine of the Language of Thought, taking account of connectionism. The main theories of consciousness are examined and the author's own approach outlined. The concluding chapter briefly resumes the theme of psychological explanation, linking it to further topics. Each chapter ends with a summary of the main points together with suggestions for further reading. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Natural Minds Thomas W. Polger, 2006-01-20 In Natural Minds Thomas Polger advocates, and defends, the philosophical theory that mind equals brain—that sensations are brain processes—and in doing so brings the mind-brain identity theory back into the philosophical debate about consciousness. The version of identity theory that Polger advocates holds that conscious processes, events, states, or properties are type- identical to biological processes, events, states, or properties—a tough-minded account that maintains that minds are necessarily identical to brains, a position held by few current identity theorists. Polger's approach to what William James called the great blooming buzzing confusion of consciousness begins with the idea that we need to know more about brains in order to understand consciousness fully, but recognizes that biology alone cannot provide the entire explanation. Natural Minds takes on issues from philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and metaphysics, moving freely among them in its discussion. Polger begins by answering two major objections to identity theory—Hilary Putnam's argument from multiple realizability (which discounts identity theory because creatures with brains unlike ours could also have mental states) and Saul Kripke's modal argument against mind-brain identity (based on the apparent contingency of the identity statement). He then offers a detailed account of functionalism and functional realization, which offer the most serious obstacle to consideration of identity theory. Polger argues that identity theory can itself satisfy the kind of explanatory demands that are often believed to favor functionalism. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: The Furniture of the World Guillermo Hurtado, Oscar Nudler, 2012 Seventeen essays make up the body of this anthology. Most of the authors are Latin Americans (although some of them work in other regions), and thus we might say that this volume is, in a very approximate sense, a showcase of recent Latin-American ontology and metaphysics. The remaining authors--Pierre Aubenque, Barry Smith, Lorenzo Peña and James Hamilton--are distinguished teachers who have had important contacts with the Latin-American philosophical community. The articles in this anthology address some of the central questions in ontology and metaphysics: the possibility of a science of being (Aubenque), the different possible approaches to ontology (Hurtado), the recent application of ontology to informatics (Smith), guise theory and its Leibnizian antecedents (Herrera), the reduction of space and time to phenomenological properties (Rodríguez Larreta), the Newtonian ontology of space and time (Benítez and Robles), the relation between truth and the so-called truth-makers (Rodríguez Pereyra), the ontological position of the Pyrrhonic skeptic (Junqueira Smith), the limits and difficulties of metaphysical realism (Cabanchik, Pereda), the defense of physicalist or emergentist positions regarding the mental (Pérez), the metaphysical nature of persons (Naishtat), the ontology of cultural entities (Peña), political ontology (Nudler), the relation between ontology and literature (Hamilton), the ontology of art (Tomasini). Some of the works (e.g., those Aubenque and Robles) approach the question from a historical perspective: others examine the most recent philosophical literature on the problems focalized (e.g., those by Pérez and Rodríguez Pereyra), and others offer new approaches (e.g., those of Rodríguez Larreta, Peña or Nudler) to a specific problematic area. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: E-Physicalism Reinaldo J. Bernal Velásquez, 2013-05-02 This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels “e-physicalism”. Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the “explanatory gap” is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent property, not reducible and endowed with original causal powers, with respect to the micro-constituents of the conscious entity. Fifthly, he addresses the “zombie argument” and the “supervenience argument” within the e-physicalism framework. Finally, he elaborates on the claim that phenomenal properties are physical and discusses the “knowledge argument”. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind E. Jonathan Lowe, 2000-01-20 A lucid and wide-ranging introduction to the philosophy of mind, suitable for readers with a basic grounding in philosophy. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Phenomenal Qualities Paul Coates, Sam Coleman, 2015 A team of distinguished philosophers and psychologists explore the nature of phenomenal qualities, the qualities of conscious experiences, and the ways in which they fit in with our understanding of mind and reality. This volume offers an indispensable resource for anyone wishing to understand the nature of conscious experience. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: The Peripheral Mind István Aranyosi, 2013-07-11 The Peripheral Mind is the first monograph to discuss the philosophical relevance of the Peripheral Nervous System. It combines conceptual analysis, discussion of neuroscientific data, philosophical speculation, and first-person phenomenological accounts to solve a wide range of extant problems in the philosophy of mind. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: The Philosophy of Mind Anthony O'Hear, 2022-06-09 A deep concern with consciousness and intentionality is one of the several things that has lately moved into the centre of the philosophy of mind. The issue of consciousness is often treated as something distinct from intentionality, but – as Tim Crane notes in his incisive new Foreword – there is now something of a sea-change. This classic volume may be at least partly responsible for the shift in how philosophy of mind is starting to be understood. Before its first appearance, discussions of consciousness and intentionality in the context of perception were in their infancy. The book was a departure from the way this part of philosophy was conceived. It pointed to new ways to look at the discipline, addressing both the epistemology of mind, and intentionality and consciousness, especially in connection with perception. Showcasing many leading figures in the field, it offers a splendid overview of the issues at stake. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Physicalism and Its Discontents Carl Gillett, Barry Loewer, 2001-11-26 A collection of essays by physicalists and their critics on the important doctrine of physicalism, first published in 2001. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: The Causal Exclusion Problem Dwayne Moore, 2014 In The Causal Exclusion Problem, the popular strategy of abandoning any one of the principles constituting the causal exclusion problem is considered, but ultimately rejected. The metaphysical foundations undergirding the causal exclusion problem are then explored, revealing that the causal exclusion problem cannot be dislodged by undermining its metaphysical foundations - as some are in the habit of doing. Finally, the significant difficulties associated with the bevy of contemporary nonreductive solutions, from supervenience to emergentism, are expanded upon. While conducting this survey of contemporary options, however, two novel approaches are introduced, both of which may resolve the causal exclusion problem from within a nonreductive physicalist paradigm. The Causal Exclusion Problem, which relentlessly motivates the vexing causal exclusion problem and exhaustively surveys its metaphysical assumptions and contemporary responses, is ideal for an advanced undergraduate or graduate course in the philosophy of mind. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: The Waning of Materialism Robert C. Koons, George Bealer, 2010-03-25 Twenty-three philosophers examine the doctrine of materialism find it wanting. The case against materialism comprises arguments from conscious experience, from the unity and identity of the person, from intentionality, mental causation, and knowledge. The contributors include leaders in the fields of philosophy of mind, metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology, who respond ably to the most recent versions and defences of materialism. The modal arguments of Kripke and Chalmers,Jackson>'s knowledge argument, Kim>'s exclusion problem, and Burge>'s anti-individualism all play a part in the building of a powerful cumulative case against the materialist research program. Several papers address the implications of contemporary brain and cognitive research (the psychophysics of colorperception, blindsight, and the effects of commissurotomies), adding a posteriori arguments to the classical a priori critique of reductionism. All of the current versions of materialism -- reductive and non-reductive, functionalist, eliminativist, and new wave materialism -- come under sustained and trenchant attack. In addition, a wide variety of alternatives to the materialist conception of the person receive new and illuminating attention, including anti-materialist versions of naturalism,property dualism, Aristotelian and Thomistic hylomorphism, and non-Cartesian accounts of substance dualism. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour Derek H. Brown, Fiona Macpherson, 2020-09-27 From David Hume’s famous puzzle about the missing shade of blue, to current research into the science of colour, the topic of colour is an incredibly fertile region of study and debate, cutting across philosophy of mind, epistemology, metaphysics, and aesthetics, as well as psychology. Debates about the nature of our experience of colour and the nature of colour itself are central to contemporary discussion and argument in philosophy of mind and psychology, and philosophy of perception. This outstanding Handbook contains 29 specially commissioned contributions by leading philosophers and examines the most important aspects of philosophy of colour. It is organized into six parts: The Importance of Colour to Philosophy The Science and Spaces of Colour Colour Phenomena Colour Ontology Colour Experience and Epistemology Language, Categories, and Thought. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of mind and psychology, epistemology, metaphysics, and aesthetics, as well as for those interested in conceptual issues in the psychology of colour. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: A Logician's Perspective on the Relation Between the Mind and Body John P. Burgess, 2024-03-25 When philosophers today debate the age-old problem of the relation of mind or soul to matter or body, they tend to get involved quickly in discussing not just what actually is but also what possibly may be or by contrast what necessarily must be. No thesis in this much-disputed area has been the topic of more extended discussion than that of the “supervenience”, as it is called, of the mental on the physical, according to which for any difference in the mental to have been possible, some difference in the physical would have been necessary. In this book a recognized authority on modal logic, the logic of the necessary and the possible, critically examines, from a logician’s distinctive point of view, the supervenience debate in philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology, and ends up questioning not so much the truth as the significance of the supervenience thesis. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Divine Action and the Human Mind Sarah Lane Ritchie, 2019-07-25 Challenges theological models of divine action that locate God's activity in human mind. Emphasizes God's relationship with all of nature. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, Sven Walter, 2009-01-15 This is the most authoritative and comprehensive guide ever published to the state of the art in philosophy of mind, a flourishing area of research. An outstanding team of contributors offer 45 new critical surveys of a wide range of topics. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Consciousness Christof Koch, 2012-03-09 A fascinating exploration of the human brain that combines “the leading edge of consciousness science with surprisingly personal and philosophical reflection . . . shedding light on how scientists really think”—this is “science writing at its best” (Times Higher Education). In which a scientist searches for an empirical explanation for phenomenal experience, spurred by his instinctual belief that life is meaningful. What links conscious experience of pain, joy, color, and smell to bioelectrical activity in the brain? How can anything physical give rise to nonphysical, subjective, conscious states? Christof Koch has devoted much of his career to bridging the seemingly unbridgeable gap between the physics of the brain and phenomenal experience. This engaging book—part scientific overview, part memoir, part futurist speculation—describes Koch’s search for an empirical explanation for consciousness. Koch recounts not only the birth of the modern science of consciousness but also the subterranean motivation for his quest—his instinctual (if “romantic”) belief that life is meaningful. Koch describes his own groundbreaking work with Francis Crick in the 1990s and 2000s and the gradual emergence of consciousness (once considered a “fringy” subject) as a legitimate topic for scientific investigation. Present at this paradigm shift were Koch and a handful of colleagues, including Ned Block, David Chalmers, Stanislas Dehaene, Giulio Tononi, Wolf Singer, and others. Aiding and abetting it were new techniques to listen in on the activity of individual nerve cells, clinical studies, and brain-imaging technologies that allowed safe and noninvasive study of the human brain in action. Koch gives us stories from the front lines of modern research into the neurobiology of consciousness as well as his own reflections on a variety of topics, including the distinction between attention and awareness, the unconscious, how neurons respond to Homer Simpson, the physics and biology of free will, dogs, Der Ring des Nibelungen, sentient machines, the loss of his belief in a personal God, and sadness. All of them are signposts in the pursuit of his life's work—to uncover the roots of consciousness. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Philosophy Nigel Warburton, 1999 An introduction to the study of philosophy with discussions on several topics including God, politics, science and art. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: Husserl David Woodruff Smith, 2013-07-04 This second edition of David Woodruff Smith’s stimulating introduction to Husserl has been fully updated and includes a new ninth chapter featuring contemporary issues confronting Husserl’s phenomenology. It introduces the whole of Edmund Husserl’s thought, demonstrating his influence on philosophy of mind and language, on ontology and epistemology, as well as ethical theory, and on philosophy of logic, mathematics, and science. Starting with an overview of Husserl’s life and works, and his place in twentieth-century philosophy and in Western philosophy as a whole, Smith introduces Husserl’s conception of phenomenology, explaining Husserl’s innovative theories of intentionality, objectivity, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity. In subsequent chapters Smith covers Husserl’s logic, metaphysics, realism and transcendental idealism, epistemology, and (meta)ethics. Finally, the author assesses the significance and implications of Husserl’s work for contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Also included is a timeline, glossary, and extensive suggestions for further reading, making Husserl, second edition, essential reading for anyone interested in phenomenology, twentieth-century philosophy, and the continuing influence of this eminent philosopher. |
| functionalist physicalism mind body problem: The Broadview Introduction to Philosophy Volume I: Knowledge and Reality Andrew Bailey, 2019-06-18 This volume of The Broadview Introduction to Philosophy offers a thoughtful selection of readings in epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of religion. Substantial selections from important historical texts are provided (including the entirety of Descartes’s Meditations), as are a number of contemporary readings on each topic. Unlike other introductory anthologies, the Broadview offers considerable apparatus to assist the student reader in understanding the texts without simply summarizing them. Each selection includes an introduction discussing the context and structure of the primary reading, as well as thorough annotations designed to clarify unfamiliar terms, references, and argument forms. |
Functionalist Perspective & Theory in Sociology - Simply Psychology
Feb 13, 2024 · What is a Functionalist Theory in Sociology? Functionalism examines how the social institutions that make up society, such as the economy, education, family, religion, and media, all …
功能主义 - 维基百科，自由的百科全书
功能主義（Functionalism）有下列幾種用法和解釋： . 结构功能主义，社會學上的解釋; 机能主义心理学派，心理學上的解釋; 功能主義建築，建築形式的一種; 生物功能主义 （ 英语 ： Biological …
Functionalism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Aug 24, 2004 · Functionalism is the doctrine that what makes something a thought, desire, pain (or any other type of mental state) depends not on its internal constitution, but solely on its function, …
Functionalism & Functionalist Perspective and Theory
In functionalist theory, the different parts of society are primarily composed of social institutions, each designed to fill various needs. Family, government, economy, media, education, and religion …
Functionalism | Structuralism, Systematic Analysis, Emile …
May 1, 2025 · functionalism, in social sciences, theory based on the premise that all aspects of a society—institutions, roles, norms, etc.—serve a purpose and that all are indispensable for the …
FUNCTIONALIST definition | Cambridge English Dictionary
FUNCTIONALIST meaning: 1. based on the principle that the most important thing about an object or building is its use…. Learn more.
The Functionalist Theory of Social Stratification: A Comprehensive ...
Sep 18, 2024 · The functionalist theory offers a unique lens through which to view social stratification. Developed primarily during the 1940s and 1950s, this perspective argues that all …
Main Functionalist Theorists and Their Contributions in Sociology
Jan 10, 2024 · Learn about functionalism, a theoretical perspective in sociology that examines how different parts of society work together to maintain social order. Explore the contributions of key …
Functionalism in Sociology: Definition, Examples, Criticism
Nov 22, 2023 · Functionalism examines the role social institutions play in keeping the social structure as a whole intact. It is one of the most prevalent theoretical frameworks in sociology …
9 Functionalism Examples (in Schools, Families & Religion)
Feb 13, 2024 · According to functionalism, the three main functions of social institutions are: Socialization: Social institutions provide the structure within which individuals learn the norms …
From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism
— in the context of the mind–body problem — just meant what I’m calling ‘substance dualism’ (and that is what unqualified occurrences of ‘dualism’ will mean in this paper). In philosophy of mind …
The Mind-Body Problem JERRY A. FODOR - lscp.net
The Mind-Body Problem JERRY A. FODOR Jerry A. Fodor is professor of philosophy at Rutgers University. He is renowned for defending the view that we think in an inner language, akin to the …
Is Psycho-Physical Emergentism Committed to Dualism? The …
the shortcomings of physicalism (the inability to allow for genuine men? tal causation), while avoiding dualism and its notorious problems with psycho-physical interaction. To explicate the …
THE BODY IDENTICAL WITH THE HUMAN MIND: A …
either under thought as a mind or under extension as a body: "mind and body are one and the same thing, conceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly, under the attribute of extension" …
The Mind-Body Problem - JSTOR
The Mind-Body Problem Neurophilosophy. Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. PATRICIA SMITH CHURCHLAND. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1986. xiv, 546 pp., illus. $27.50. …
Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Mind Problem
see. My task today is to illustrate that non-reductive physicalism’s approach to the mind-body problem will look quite different—indeed, incoherent— once its position on substance is better …
The Mind-Body Problem - Springer
ence body, despite the fact that mind is a product of body. This is the Mind-Body problem, unsolved through the ages. Let us approach this dilemma in another way. The alleged fact that there must …
1. Introduction - newdualism.org
1.1 The Mind-Body-Problem In one of its traditional forms the mind body problem is stated in causal terms. For the following argument I assume a metaphysical-realist account of causation. …
Pain, Private Language and the Mind-Body Problem
that phyBicalist or functionalist theories of the mind capture the qualitative character of our experiences; nor do I think they can. I do not believe, however, that Warner's argument …
The Mind-body Problem and Cognitive Neuroscience: A Brief …
The mind-body problem is a long-standing question in philosophy: what exactly is the causal relationship between the properties of the mind, particularly conscious experience, ...
TROUBLES WITH FUNCTIONALISM - PSTRUC
1.0 Functionalism, Behaviorism, and Physicalism The functionalist view of the nature of the mind is now widely accepted. Like behaviorism and physicalism, functionalism seeks to answer the …
Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem
ability Arguments, have to say about the mind-body problem. These arguments have two different versions. In one version, considerations of conceivability are taken to support the claim that …
1567 01 13. - Massachusetts Institute of Technology
mind-body problem. Solutions to the mind-body problem usually try to answer ques- ... Smart’s ‘‘topic-neutral’’ analyses led Armstrong and Lewis to a functionalist analysis of mental concepts. …
An African Perspective on the Nature of Mind: Reflections on
The problem of the nature of mind has lingered for a long tim e. Generated by the ques - tion of whether the mind is an independently existing entity or merely an aspect of bodily events and …
1 Consciousness: The Hard Problem - University of Illinois …
problem. In this lecture, I will discuss some of the problems with functionalism and more generally physicalism. 2 Dualism Conscious states are not physical states. The mind is di erent in kind from …
PHYSICALISM OR ANTI-PHYSICALISM: A DISJUNCTIVE …
physicalism. We then sketch how our proposal can be adopted by both physicalists and anti-physicalists, yielding two distinct ways of approaching the mind-body problem. We argue that …
1. Introduction - PhilPapers
1.1 The Mind-Body-Problem In one of its traditional forms the mind body problem is stated in causal terms. For the following argument I assume a metaphysical-realist account of causation. …
Classic Text 19 - Philosophy of Mind: Functionalism
approaches to the mind-body problem fell into two exclusive categories: dualism and materialism. According to dualism, the mind is a non-physical entity or substance entirely distinct from that of …
24.09x Minds and Machines Ned Block, “What is functionalism?”
states in terms of an empirical computational theory of the mind. Second, Smart’s “topic neutral” analyses led Armstrong and Lewis to a functionalist analysis of mental concepts. Third, …
The Mind-Body Problem JERRY A. FODOR - lscp.net
The Mind-Body Problem JERRY A. FODOR Jerry A. Fodor is professor of philosophy at Rutgers University. He is renowned for defending the view that we think in an inner language, akin to the …
CONCEIVING THE IMPOSSIBLE AND THE MIND-BODY …
conceiving the impossible and the mind-body problem Royal Institute of Philosophy annual lecture, given in London on February 18, 1998 published in Philosophy vol. 73 no. 285, July 1998, pp 337 …
The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Progressivism of …
zation, and memory, such aspects of the mind–body problem are easy given a functionalist reductive explanation. An enormous swathe of what was previously seen as a daunting and …
From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism - Rutgers University
— in the context of the mind–body problem — just meant what I’m calling ‘substance dualism’ (and that is what unqualified occurrences of ‘dualism’ will mean in this paper). In philosophy of mind …
Does Neuroplasticity Support the Hypothesis of Multiple …
Many of today’s theories regarding the mind-body problem attempt to cope with multiple realization, including all forms of nonreductive physicalism, as well as the functionalist theory of …
Thomas Nagel, ‘What is it like to be a bat?’
relation between mind and body—why, indeed, we have at present no conception of what an explanation of the physical nature of a mental phenomenon would be. Without consciousness the …
1 Chomsky on the Mind–Body Problem - Blackwell Publishing
Chomsky on the Mind–Body Problem WILLIAM G. LYCAN Ontological questions are generally beside the point, hardly more than a form of ... as a zealous Functionalist myself, try to rebut them …
The Mind–Body Problem and Whitehead’s Non-reductive …
able to give us new traction on the larger problem of restructuring the ossified problem space of the mind–body problem. Sections II and III will outline the unconventional ideas Whitehead developed …
That Marcus Family Home
The Mind-Body Problem JERRY A. FODOR Jerry A. Fodor is professor' of philosophy at Rutgers University. He is renowned for defending the view that we think in an inner language, akin to the …
Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem
continue to believe that no purely functionalist characterization of a system entails-simply in virtue of our mental concepts-that the system is conscious. So I want to propose an alternative. In our …
Grounding, Conceivability, and the Mind-Body Problem
Grounding, Conceivability, and the Mind-Body Problem ... The two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism proceeds as follows. ‘P ∧¬Q’ can receive a truth value relative to …
1. Introduction - newdualism.org
1.1 The Mind-Body-Problem In one of its traditional forms the mind body problem is stated in causal terms. For the following argument I assume a metaphysical-realist account of causation. …
The Status of the Mind within Neo-Russellian Monism
others, avoiding both type-identity and functionalist physicalism as well as emergentist and substance dualism. 1 Eliminative materialism, though arguably a form of physicalism, ... It is a …
MIND BODY PROBLEM' - JSTOR
MIND BODY PROBLEM' by Marie McGinn ABSTRACT Naturalism about the mind is often taken to be equivalent to some form of physicalism: the existence of mental properties must be shown not to …
UNIT 3 MIND AND BODY IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY
The mind-body problem, i.e. how the mind and the body are interrelated, is commonly seen as the most centric problem in the philosophy of mind. The other relevant issues discussed in the …
Physicalism - University of Missouri
Montero, Barbara. “The Body Problem.” Noûs 33.2 (1999): 183–200. Provocative and wide-ranging account of the difficulties that beset attempts to characterize the “physical” for the purpose of …
Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind …
physicalist solution to the mind-body problem: in particular, supervenience is ... philosophers of mind: non-reductive physicalism cannot account for mental ... he proposes a functionalist …
Fundamentality and the Mind-Body Problem - Springer
As Theodore Sider has pointed out, anti-physicalism is consistent with a sparse ontology. However, I will try to show that the premises of the standard ... discussions of the mind–body problem. Anti …
Dualism vs. Materialism: A Response to Paul Churchland
and positions associated with the mind-body problem. This problem has many facets, and Churchland addresses several of them, including the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, …
The Status of the Mind within Neo-Russellian Monism
others, avoiding both type-identity and functionalist physicalism as well as emergentist and substance dualism. 1 Eliminative materialism, though arguably a form of physicalism, ... It is a …
Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum - JSTOR
for the functionalist to make sense of thought experiments involving ... "The Mind-Body Problem," Scientific American 244 (January i98i): 114-25, p. IZ. ' David Lewis, "Mad Pain and Martian Pain" …
Grounding, conceivability, and the mind-body problem
Grounding, conceivability, and the mind-body problem Hasen Khudairi 1 Received: 11 January 2016 / Accepted: 22 October 2016 / Published online: 8 November 2016 ... The two-dimensional ...
Functionalism encyclopedia article - Department of Computer …
terms of an empirical computational theory of the mind. Second, Smart’s "topic neutral" analyses led Armstrong and Lewis to a functionalist analysis of mental concepts. Third, Wittgenstein’s idea …
Why Functionalism Is a Form of ‘Token-Dualism’
4 all over the universe, might always lead to one and the same physical "correlate" of pain. But this is certainly an ambitious hypothesis. Finally, the hypothesis becomes still more ambitious when …
Does Chat Gpt Pass The Turing Test (PDF) - mobile.frcog.org
Does Chat Gpt Pass The Turing Test Book Review: Unveiling the Power of Words In some sort of driven by information and connectivity, the ability of words has become more evident than ever.
Materialism and the Mind and Body Problem: A Critical Analysis
The philosophy of mind has become dominated by the mind and body problem: the relation between the physical (the body) and the ... known as physicalism) and functionalism. Many tend to believe …
METAPHYSICS OF MIND - University of Cincinnati
As Jaegwon Kim puts it, ‘the mind-body problem—our mind-body problem—has been that of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical’ (1998). Today the most …
What Constitutes the Mind-Body Problem? - JSTOR
unsolved problem here, or that "physicalism" is false; my aim is merely to make epistemological sense of our predicament in appreciating and trying to formulate the mind-body problem.) It may …
A FAMILIAR reaction to the persistence of the mind-body …
a solution to the mind-body problem is in principle beyond our reach. II The chief flaw in McGinn's reasoning, I suggest, is the way he con- ... functionalist theory even in the remote future ([2], …
Concealment and Exposure and Other Essays (New York,
I. The Mind-Body Problem after Kripke This essay will explore an approach to the mind-body problem that is distinct both from dualism and from the sort of conceptual reduction of the …
Dual-aspect monism, version 2 - PhilPapers
In this article, I am interested in the mind-body problem, qua metaphysical problem, and I defend a version of dual-aspect monism as a solution to it. This view is not new, but it is somewhat under …
